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Since taking power in 1952, the Egyptian government has 
had to face political opposition from the Islamist movement. 
Egyptian leaders have used various policies to neutralize 
the Islamists, however, the opposition has become 
increasingly violent and presents a threat to the stability 
of the Egyptian government.  In the political environment of 
the Middle East, Egypt has long been a leader among Arab 
states and an intermediary between them and the West. 
Therefore, the stability of the Egyptian government is 
important to the United States in terms of regional peace 
and influence. 
Within the Middle East, there have been other countries 
that have also encountered political opposition from 
Islamist movements and have instituted various policies from 
repression to co-optation in response.  The focus of this 
thesis is on the different governmental responses to Islamic 
extremism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, the effects of those 
responses on their respective Islamist movements, and how 
those effects compare to the Egyptian situation.  Based on 
these comparisons, the conclusion is drawn that, unless 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In Egypt, violent political opposition from Islamists 
has become a threat to the regime.  Each of the last three 
Egyptian presidents, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and 
Hosni Mubarak, have used policies of repression and co- 
optation in efforts to control or eliminate the Islamist 
movement.  These policies have had a direct effect on the 
growth and development of the Egyptian Islamist movement and 
have contributed to Egypt's current political climate. 
While all three presidents had to deal with Islamist 
opposition, under the present administration of President 
Mubarak the groups have gained considerable strength and 
become exceedingly violent.  The spread of Islamism as well 
as the intensity of the opposition have raised doubts to the 
survivability of the regime.  In an effort to destroy this 
opposition, President Mubarak has resorted to a policy of 
severe repression.  It is difficult to predict whether the 
Egyptian government will survive and the Islamist movement 
will be crushed or if the Islamists will become strong 
enough to overthrow the regime. 
Egypt is not the only Arab country to experience 
opposition from Islamic extremists; the governments in 
Syria, Jordan and Algeria have also had to deal with similar 
situations.  While each of these countries has had to face 
serious political opposition from Islamist groups, they have 
resorted to different policies to deal with the situation. 
Syria's response to Islamist opposition is an example of 
brutal repression that resulted in the virtual elimination 
of the movement.  Jordanian Islamists have been assimilated 
into normal political discourse through governmental 
policies of co-optation.  Algeria's government did not 
immediately institute a decisive policy but instead 
vacillated between concession and repression, resulting in a 
fierce struggle with the Islamists over the fate of the 
country. 
Egyptian governmental responses to Islamist opposition 
in the past have had varied results.  However, those 
policies have not been successful in ending the movement, 
and Islamist opposition has become more powerful in the last 
decade under President Mubarak than during previous regimes. 
By analyzing the governmental responses to Islamic extremism 
in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, one may be able to better 
understand the forces involved and forecast what may occur 
as a result from the present Egyptian response.  Therefore, 
the focus of this thesis is on the different governmental 
responses to Islamism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, the 
effects of those responses on their respective Islamist 
movements, and how those effects compare to the Egyptian 
situation. 
The Syrian model is one which has the most limited 
value in a sense of duplication or imitation, but does 
provide an example of the necessary ingredients for a 
successful policy of repression.  Jordan is an example worth 
emulating, not only because of its relative success at 
assimilating the Islamists into the political system, but 
also the humanity that the government has demonstrated in 
its dealings with the opposition relative to both Syria and 
Algeria as well as Egypt.  Algeria is not only an example of 
the failure of governmental policy in dealing with 
Islamists, but also demonstrates how important it is to have 
a successful policy.  Larger trends found by analyzing the 
three countries as a group show that the key to the success 
or failure of government policies towards Islamist political 
opposition in Arab countries is the loyalty of the military 
to the leader. 
Therefore, in order for Egypt to control the Islamist 
movement, it must channel them into non-violent opposition 
through political liberalization.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
must be allowed to have its own political party and provide 
candidates for elections.  The poor economic conditions in 
Egypt cannot be solved quickly and the situation is only 
exacerbated by denying the Islamists a voice in government. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Free Officers took power in the revolution in 
1952, Islamist groups have been active in political 
opposition to the Egyptian government.  The degree of 
opposition has varied over the years, from vocal protests to 
acts of violence against government officials and tourists, 
including the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 
1981.  Each of the last three presidents since the 
revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni 
Mubarak, have used policies of repression and co-optation in 
efforts to control or eliminate the Islamist movement. 
These policies have had a direct effect on the growth and 
development of the Egyptian Islamist movement and have 
contributed to Egypt's current political climate.  While all 
three presidents had to deal with an Islamist opposition, 
under the present administration of President Mubarak the 
groups have gained considerable strength and become 
exceedingly violent.  The spread of Islamism as well as the 
intensity of the opposition have raised doubts as to the 
survivability of the regime. 
In an effort to destroy this opposition, President 
Mubarak has resorted to a policy of severe repression.  It 
is difficult to predict whether the Egyptian government will 
survive and the Islamist movement will be crushed or whether 
the Islamists will become strong enough to overthrow the 
regime.  However, Egypt is not the only Arab country to 
experience opposition from Islamic extremists.  The 
governments in Syria, Jordan and Algeria have also had to 
deal with similar situations.  While each of these countries 
has had to face serious political opposition from Islamist 
groups, they have resorted to different policies to deal 
with the situation.  Syria's response to Islamist opposition 
is an example of brutal repression that resulted in the 
virtual elimination of the movement.  Jordanian Islamists 
have been assimilated into normal political discourse 
through governmental policies of co-optation.  Algeria's 
government did not immediately institute a decisive policy 
but instead vacillated between concession and repression, 
resulting in a fierce struggle with the Islamists over the 
fate of the country. 
Egyptian governmental responses to Islamist opposition 
in the past have had varied results.  However, those 
policies have not been successful in ending the movement, 
and Islamist opposition has become more powerful in the last 
decade under President Mubarak than during previous regimes. 
By analyzing the governmental responses to Islamic extremism 
in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, one may be able to better 
understand the forces involved and forecast what may occur 
as a result from the present Egyptian response.  Such an 
analysis would also be helpful in the formulation of a 
policy that would best serve the interests of the Egyptian 
government as well as the Egyptian people.  Therefore, the 
focus of this thesis is on the different governmental 
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responses to Islamism in Syria, Jordan and Algeria, the 
effects of those responses on their respective Islamist 
movements, and how those effects compare to the Egyptian 
situation. 
The Islamist movement in Syria began in 1945 with the 
formation of a Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The 
Brotherhood became very active in politics, however, the 
Syrian government banned the organization and adopted a 
policy of gradually increasing repression.  After Hafiz Asad 
gained power in 1970 through a military coup, the Islamists 
became increasingly active and violent in an effort to 
topple what they considered a corrupt government.  In 1980, 
a coalition of opposition groups formed under the banner of 
Islam called the Islamic Front.  This organization proved to 
be very popular and gained support quickly.  It engaged in 
violent acts such as assassination of public officials and 
car bombings in its efforts to overthrow the government. 
Sympathy for the group became so widespread and the acts 
against the government so frequent that the situation could 
be called an open rebellion.  President Asad quickly acted 
to eliminate this opposition through brutal methods of 
repression.  In 1982, this policy culminated with the 
massacre of thousands of people in the city of Hama by 
12,000 soldiers sent there to put down an uprising.  The 
repressive policies of Hafiz Asad effectively eradicated the 
political opposition of the Islamist movement in Syria. 
Since his ascension to the throne in 1953, Jordan's 
King Hussein has also had to deal with Islamist opposition. 
The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has a 
substantial following and is politically active.  Instead of 
a policy of repression, however, King Hussein has adopted a 
policy of co-optation designed to pacify and contain 
Islamist activism by assimilating them into the country's 
political arena.  The Brotherhood has been permitted to 
exist, unlike in Syria and Egypt.  Islamic symbols and 
practices are publicly promoted and observed including 
religious radio and television programs and mosque 
construction.  The response by Islamists has been very 
positive and the king's policies have been effective in 
minimizing the threat to his regime from Islamist 
opposition.1 
Algerian Islamism has only recently become prominent in 
world news.  The declining economic situation in Algeria 
beginning in the late 1970s gave rise to a vocal Islamist 
movement, particularly among university students.  The 
nature of the opposition grew from demonstrations to violent 
acts with the aim of dissolving the present government and 
instituting an Islamic based government.  The government 
used police and the military to crack down on the Islamic 
extremists; on 6 October 1988 hundreds of people were killed 
in Algiers and other cities as police brutally put down an 
Ipeter Gubser, "Jordan: Balancing Pluralism and Authoritarianism", 
Ideology and Power in the Middle East, Peter Chelkowski and Robert 
Pranger, eds., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988) p. 97. 
uprising with automatic weapons.  Shortly afterwards, the 
Islamists organized themselves into the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), a religious party which quickly gained of 
popular support.  Members of FIS became candidates in 
regional elections and won staggering victories.  However, 
the secular government was unwilling to cede power to the 
Islamists and the result was a civil war between the 
military and the Islamists.  The political landscape of 
Algeria became chaos with the final outcome yet to be 
decided. 
In the political environment of the Middle East, Egypt 
has long been a leader among Arab states and an intermediary 
between them and the West.  The stability of the Egyptian 
government is important to the United States in terms of 
regional peace and influence.  It is therefore important to 
have a good understanding of the political situation in 
Egypt, the nature and strength of the opposition and the 
government's response to that opposition.  It is most 
important, however, to be able to forecast as much as 
possible the development of the political environment in the 
future.  Such forecasting makes advanced planning and policy 
formulation possible for all contingencies.  This thesis 
will use controlled comparison of historical cases in order 
to: a) analyze the effects of different policies in similar 
situations, b) apply those effects to the policies 
instituted in the principal case, c) draw conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness and outcome of the policies in 
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the principal case.  The cases used for comparison have been 
chosen because they provide examples of different 
governmental responses to similar Islamist opposition: Syria 
with overwhelming repression, Jordan with co-optation, and 
Algeria with initial inconsistency followed by repression. 
The results of these different policies have been quite 
distinct, pointing to a causal effect and, therefore, being 
potentially applicable to the Egyptian situation. 
II. SYRIA: EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL REPRESSION 
A. APPLICATION TO THE EGYPTIAN CASE 
Since Syria's Ba'thist regime came to power in 1963, it 
has had to contend with political opposition from urban- 
based Islamist groups, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The secular, socialist policies of the Ba'thists are 
antithetical to the Islamist desire for an Islamic Republic 
based on the Qu'ran and the Shariah as well as economically 
detrimental to the middle and upper class merchants (i.e. 
the commercial elite) from where the Muslim Brotherhood gets 
most of its members, especially in the Syrian cities. 
Political opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
the largest and most organized threat to the government 
since the Ba'thists took power, escalating from 
demonstrations and riots to assassinations and bombings. 
The opposition culminated in a mass-supported open rebellion 
from 1976 to 1982, when large segments of the population 
rallied behind the Brotherhood and participated in uprisings 
against the government.  In response, President Hafiz al- 
Asad met the rebellion with brutal repression, eliminating 
the Islamist political opposition and regaining control of 
the country.  The victory of the Ba'thist government over 
the Islamist movement was due to several situational factors 
combined with the government's willingness and ability to 
use overwhelming force to eliminate the insurgents. 
The Syrian government's response provides a good 
example of the effects of policies of repression on domestic 
Islamist opposition and is, therefore, a relevant case study 
in a comparative sense for the present situation in Egypt. 
The level of Islamist opposition experienced in Syria during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s was far more severe and 
widespread than Egypt experiences today or has in the past. 
However, the two cases are still quite similar: both involve 
the regime's struggle against Islamist opposition groups 
which advocate the use of violence to overthrow the 
government in favor of an Islamist -Republic.  With this in 
mind, the policies implemented by the Syrian government 
during the crisis can be regarded as successful in that they 
ended the rebellion and destroyed the opposition. 
Therefore, an analysis of the Syrian Islamist rebellion and 
the government's response may provide the Egyptian 
government with an answer to their own Islamist problem. 
B. ISLAMIST OPPOSITION TO THE BA'TH REGIME 
It is important to understand the reasons for the 
Islamist opposition to the Ba'thist government in order to 
comprehend the nature of the rebellion and why it gained 
popular support as well as why the governmental response of 
repression was successful in putting it down.  The source of 
antipathy of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Ba'th Party is 
manifold but centers around the Ba'thist secularism.  The 
Brotherhood's raison  d'etre  is to establish a government 
based on Islamic tenets where religion plays the central 
role in society.  However, the Ba'thist ideology is secular 
and egalitarian, rejecting the tribal social and political 
structure.2  From this basic ideological difference, several 
corresponding cleavages have formed between the Islamists 
and the Ba'thists which may be classified as social, 
sectarian and economic. 
1. Social Cleavages 
Many of the cleavages begin with the Syrian social 
structure.  Syrian society has historically been very 
traditional and, over the centuries, this has led to a rigid 
class structure.  The social organization revolved around 
villages and tribes which each had notable families that 
presided as the local authority.  This class structure was 
fixed so that it became very difficult for those not born 
into the notable families to dramatically improve their lot 
in life or raise their social position in relation to the 
notables.  The Ba'th Party had been formed by middle class 
intellectuals and lower middle class army officers who were 
dissatisfied with the efforts of the traditional notables in 
the fight against French colonialism.  The lack of social 
mobility, however, prevented much action on the part of the 
non-notable and resulted in rebellion against the class 
system. As a consequence, the Ba'thist ideology was secular 
and egalitarian, rejecting the tribal social and political 
^Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian  Power and State Formation  in 
Bathist Syria,   (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) pp. 80-119. 
structure.3 When the Ba'thists took power in the early 
1960s they began to institute reforms with the intention of 
abolishing the old class system.  Those who profited from 
the existing social structure tended to sympathize with the 
Muslim Brethren.  On the other hand, those who did enjoy the 
benefits of the Syrian class system tended to support the 
Ba'th Party.  Many lower and lower middle class Syrians 
prospered from Ba'thist rule and reform, while many of the 
high and middle class urban notables and merchants lost much 
of their income, wealth and status to the same reforms. 
2. Sectarian Cleavages 
Another cleavage within Syrian society that creates 
hate and discontent among the Islamists towards the 
Ba'thists is the sectarian nature of the regime.  Syria is a 
heterogeneous society: the majority are Sunni Muslims but 
there are significant minority groups of Alawis, Christians, 
and Druze.  The Ba'thist ruling elite gradually became 
dominated by a minority religious group called Alawis. A 
heterodox offshoot of Shi'ism, the Alawi religion contains 
enough differences from mainstream Islam that it is 
considered by most Muslims to be a heresy.  As a result, the 
Alawis became a repressed group.  Discrimination against 
Alawis kept most of them extremely poor and isolated to the 
Lattakia region.  The Ba'th Party offered this minority a 
chance to advance within the society and many took advantage 
of the opportunity, eventually dominating the Ba'thist 
3Ibid,  pp. 80-119. 
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leadership.  The Alawite domination of the Ba'th Party and 
the Syrian government was completed with the rise of Hafiz 
al-Asad to the presidency in 1970.  Part of the rationale of 
the Muslim Brotherhood's assassination campaign of the late 
1970s was to bring attention to just how entrenched the 
Alawis were among the country's leaders.  The concept of 
minority rule, especially when the minority consisted of 
apostates and the rule was secular, enraged many devout 
Sunnis. 
3. Economic Cleavages 
The enmity felt by the Islamists towards the Ba'thists 
was aggravated by Asad's economic policies in the late 
1970s.  The membership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
consisted mainly of middle and lower middle class merchants 
from the cities.  The souks were usually in the vicinity of 
a mosque and, in fact, many of the ulama supplemented their 
income through small business.  Ba'thist policies of 
industrialization and nationalization put many of these 
merchants out of work and drastically reduced the income of 
the rest.  Construction and industry brought in large 
numbers of rural migrants who crowded the cities and took 
jobs away from the urban middle class.  The result was that 
the traditional membership of the Brotherhood was hit hard 
in the wallet, further increasing their opposition to the 
regime.4 
4
Alasdair Drysdale, "The Asad Regime and Its Troubles", Merip Reports 
no. 110, pp. 3-11. 
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C. THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BRETHREN 
1. Beginnings 
Numerous Islamist groups existed in Syria prior to 
World War II, mainly concentrated in the northern cities of 
Horns, Hama and Aleppo.  Hama especially, as the center of 
the old Sunni landed class, was a bastion for conservative 
minded Syrians.  These groups included the Muslim 
Brotherhood, imported from Egypt via Syrian and Egyptian 
followers of founder Hasan al-Banna.  In 1944, a Muslim 
cleric, or alim,   from Horns and graduate of al-Azhar 
University in Cairo named Mustafa al-Sibai organized many of 
the small Islamist groups into one organization under the 
banner of the Brotherhood.  Sibai made the organization into 
a respectable political force, entering candidates in 
elections and winning many campaigns in the northern cities. 
The history of the organization prior to 1963 was relatively 
uneventful save officially being banned from 1952 to 1954 
during the dictatorship of Colonel Adib al-Shishakli and 
from 1958 to 1961 during the union with Egypt.  However, 
with the rise of the Ba'th party to power in 1963, the 
Brotherhood became heavily involved in Syrian politics, 
playing the role of opposition party.5 
5
Umar F. Abd-Allah, The  Islamic Struggle  in  Syria,    (Berkeley: Mizan 
Press, 1983) pp. 88-101. 
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2. History of Opposition 
Islamist opposition to the Ba'thist regime began just 
over a year after the Ba'thist coup in February 1963.  In 
April 1964, a high school student in Hama was arrested for 
erasing a pro-Ba'th slogan that his teacher had written on 
the blackboard.  When the news of the arrest spread, 
students began demonstrations and Sunni imams protested from 
the mosques.  When a young demonstrator was killed by police 
the outrage spread and merchants closed their stores the 
next day. The call "Islam or the Ba'th" was shouted from 
loudspeakers in minarets at night.  Troops were called in to 
quell the disturbance and killed several people when they 
shelled the Mosque of al-Sultan.  Blood had been drawn and 
the Muslim Brotherhood was not about to let the opportunity 
pass to rally the people against the government.  After the 
shelling of the mosque, resentment and outrage led to 
nationwide strikes and demonstrations.  The reaction was 
widespread and was not exclusively Islamist, however, the 
Brotherhood seized the opportunity to organize the 
demonstrations and strikes, thus seizing the leadership role 
in active opposition to the regime.6 
The government moved in and put down the uprising in 
May.  The greatest violence occurred in Hama, where the 
uprising had begun.  Tanks were brought in and used to shell 
parts of the city controlled by the insurgents.  In the end, 
6Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in  the Middle East,   (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1988) p. 86. 
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about  seventy Muslim Brothers were  killed.     Arrests  of 
suspected leaders were made and shops were  forced to open 
for business.7     The  significance  of the  strength of  the 
revolt  did not  escape  the  government.   Several  reforms  and 
concessions were made  including a new constitution which 
declared  Islam as  the basis   for  legislation,   stipulated that 
the head of  state must be Muslim,   and guaranteed more 
liberal political  rights.8 
The Hama revolt was put down but  the underlying 
opposition did not  go  away,   resurfacing  several more  times 
in the  1960s.     Between  1965  and  1967,   there were two more 
Muslim Brethren led uprisings,   although they were much 
smaller  and less  violent  than the Hama uprising in  1964. 
The  first  of these uprisings,   in January  1965,   was  in 
response  to  socialist economic policies  such as  land reform 
and nationalization of industry and foreign trade.     These 
policies were not only intended to  improve  the  economy but 
also to  "shift  the balance of  social power  in  Syria,   to 
break the hegemony of the upper  and upper middle  classes 
over the  economy,   to  snap ties  of  economic dependency 
between them and the masses,   and to  link the masses  to  the 
Ba'thi  state."9    Actually,   it was  the  small merchants  and 
7Patrick  Seale,   Asad of Syria:   The Struggle for  the Middle East, 
(Berkeley:   University of California  Press,   1989)   pp.   92-94. 
8Raymond A.   Hinnebusch,   "The  Islamic Movement in Syria:   Sectarian 
Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime", 
Islamic .Resurgence in  the Arab World,  Ali  E.   Hillal  Dessouki,   ed.    (New 
York:   Praeger  Publishers,   1982)   p.158  and Derek Hopwood,   Syria  1945- 
1986:  Politics and Society,   (London:   Unwin Hyman,   1988)   p.   99. 
9Hinnebusch,   "The  Islamic Movement  in  Syria.",   p.   158. 
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artisans that felt the most economic pain due to the new 
policies.  This brought about new strikes, demonstrations 
and protests, however, the base of support was generally 
contained within the Muslim Brethren.  The only other major 
disturbance during this time occurred in April 1967 when an 
article by an army officer denouncing religion was printed 
in an army magazine.  The article described religion as a 
concept that had outlived its usefulness; the modern man 
must realize that the only one he can count on is himself. 
In the strikes and demonstrations that followed, Christian 
clergy and merchants joined the Muslim Brethren until the 
government cracked down with arrests and forced the souks to 
reopen.10 
Between 1968 and 1970 the Muslim Brotherhood 
experienced an internal division between the moderate 
leadership of exiled Isam al-Attar and the more militant 
views of the Brotherhood in the northern cities led by Adnan 
Sa'd al-Din.  The Brethren in the northern cities wanted to 
begin a "jihad" or holy war against the government while 
those loyal to Attar, mainly in Damascus, favored less 
violent approaches.  The energies of the Brotherhood were 
thus spent trying to reconcile their internal differences 
and not in active opposition to the regime.  Ultimately, the 
Brotherhood divided into two groups in 1971 with the 
majority following the militant Sa'd al-Din.n 
10Ijbid,  pp.   159-160 
1:LAbd-Allah,   pp.   107-8. 
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While the Muslim Brotherhood was undergoing its 
leadership crisis, Hafiz al-Asad took power in 1970.  Asad 
was more nationalist and less socialist than his 
predecessor, Salah Jadid, and began.to improve relations 
with the merchant class by counteracting some of the 
detrimental socialist policies of the 1960s.  The honeymoon 
with the Islamists lasted until 1973, when Asad had his 
first confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood.  The issue 
was the draft of a new constitution issued in February 1973 
which deleted the requirement for the head of state to be 
Muslim and declared that Islamic law was only a  source of 
legislation, rather than the  source.  The Brotherhood and 
the ulama joined forces and demanded that the constitution 
proclaim Islam the official religion of Syria.  Protests, 
demonstrations, riots and strikes organized and led by the 
Brotherhood spread from Hama to Aleppo, Horns and Damascus. 
The government compromised by including the requirement for 
the head of state to be Muslim but many were not satisfied 
and it took the government until April to suppress the 
protests.12 
After the 1973 war, the Islamist opposition was 
somewhat pacified by a booming economy.  A period of 
prosperity arose due to several factors which coincided: the 
oil price explosion of 1973-4 made Syrian income from oil 
exports rise from $67 million in 1973 to $412 million in 
1974; an exceptionally good cotton crop increased the 
12Munsonf pp. 88-9. 
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profits by $80 million in one year; and foreign aid from 
Arab states increased due to Syria's front line role in the 
conflict with Israel.13 However, the days of harmony were 
numbered.  By 1976, the Syrian situation had become ripe for 
rebellion.  The economy had lost its momentum with an 
inflation rate of 30 percent which created and environment 
for dissension.  Two incidents triggered the beginning of 
the Muslim Brotherhood's jihad against the regime and what 
would become a mass-based rebellion: the involvement of 
Syrian troops  in the war in Lebanon, and the arrest and 
death of a popular opposition leader. 
D. ISLAMIST UPRISING 1976-1982 
Beginning in 197 6 the Muslim Brotherhood waged a six- 
year struggle against the Ba'thist regime in Syria.  The 
group was still divided into two camps - the militants and 
the moderates - but the majority sided with the militants. 
The Brotherhood formed its own army, called the Combat 
Vanguard, which began the jihad with attacks on government 
officials and buildings.  As the violence increased, the 
opposition gained tacit support from the population, if not 
active participation.  The movement reached its apex in 1980 
with mass based uprisings in the northern cities. 
1. Catalysts for "Jihad" 
The incidents that provoked the Muslim Brotherhood into 
action in 1976 are twofold.  First, Marwin Hadid, a Muslim 
13Drysdale, p. 5. 
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activist loosely tied with the Brotherhood, was arrested, 
tortured and died in prison in February.  Hadid had been one 
of the leaders of the 1964 uprising and had spent time in 
jail in Egypt with Sayyid Qutb, a chief ideologue of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and martyr of the Egyptian 
Islamist movement.  Although Hadid1s association with the 
Brotherhood was not a formal one, he had a loyal following 
which consisted of many members of the Brotherhood and was 
revered by the militant Brethren for his activism against 
the government.  His death in a government prison, although 
it was brought about mainly by self starvation, became a 
rallying cry of the Islamist movement.14 
The other catalyst for the beginning of jihad was 
Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war.  Asad's 
decision to send 30,000 troops in on the side of the 
Maronite Christians against the Palestinians was unpopular 
among the Syrian populace, particularly the Muslims, and 
discredited the regime's pan-Arab stance.  This view was 
further aggravated when Syrian forces engaged the 
Palestinian army in the mountains, allowing the Maronite 
Phalange to massacre several thousand Palestinians in the 
unprotected Tal al-Zar camp.15 The perception of betrayal 
of the Palestinians also confirmed the belief among the 
Brethren that Asad and his fellow Alawis were not true 
14Abd-Allah, pp. 103-7. 
15Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren", Merip Reports  no. 110 (Nov- 
Dec 1982) p.20. 
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Muslims.  The government was perceived by the Islamists as 
anti-Islamic. 
2. Targets 
The Muslim Brotherhood's jihad against the Syrian 
government began with attacks on Alawi leaders, security 
agents and party professionals with guerrilla hit-and-run 
tactics and assassinations.  The selection of targets made 
it obvious that the Brotherhood's goals were to make a point 
of how many Alawis held high ranking positions as well as 
unite the Sunni majority against the Alawi minority by 
drawing the government into punishing the community for the 
acts of the group.16 The selection of targets increased in 
scope with time so that by the end of the 1970s the 
Islamists were attacking government buildings, police 
stations, Ba'th Party centers and were assassinating Soviet 
military advisors.  Between 1979 and 1981 the Islamists 
killed over 300 people, mainly Ba'thists and Alawis, in 
Aleppo alone.17  In June 1979, the government was brought 
face to face with the growing power and brazenness of the 
Islamists when they entered the Aleppo artillery school and 
massacred 83 cadets, the majority of which were Alawi.  The 
next year the mass-based nature of the uprising became 
apparent when a general strike was called in Aleppo and 
spread to other northern cities.  Finally, in February 1982 
XDR. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution:   Fundamentalism in   the Arab 
World,   (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985) p. 115 and Drysdale, 
J-'Seale, p. 325. 
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the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama began another uprising which 
was supported and joined by many who were not associated 
with the Brotherhood.  With the support of the people the 
Brotherhood seized control of the city for about three 
weeks.  In this final uprising, the people of Hama, led by 
Muslim Brothers, battled with Syrian army troops in bloody 
street fighting. 
3. Popular Support 
What becomes apparent from the narrative of the 
progression of the rebellion from 1976 until the Hama 
uprising in 1982 is the growing strength of the Islamist 
movement and the increasing amount of support from the 
general population.  This can be seen in the scope of 
government targets growing from hit-and-run attacks on 
individuals to attacks on police stations and party 
headquarters to attacks on military schools to actual combat 
with army troops.  By one estimate in Aleppo alone the 
membership of the Muslim Brotherhood increased from 800 in 
1975 to over 5000 by 1978.18 Another estimate put the total 
membership of all Islamist groups in the late 1970s at 
30,000.19  There is little dispute that the membership of 
the Islamist opposition grew during the time that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was waging its jihad against the government. 
There were also those who did not join the Islamists 
but nonetheless gave passive as well as active support to 
18Batatu, p. 20. 
•^Dekmejian, p. 118. 
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its efforts.  Even those who did not agree with the 
Islamists followed the lead of the Muslim Brethren in 
political attacks on the government.  In 1978 and 1979 the 
Lawyer's Union issued declarations which demanded the 
establishment of democracy, an end to human rights abuses by 
the government and an end to martial law.  In 1980 the 
General Conference of Engineers joined the Lawyers Union in 
issuing similar declarations for democracy and against 
political arrests and oppression.20 Although neither union 
directly supported the efforts of the Brotherhood, the vocal 
opposition to the government's treatment of political 
prisoners and support for freedom of speech provided 
encouragement and support for the Brethren in an indirect 
fashion.  The support was mainly due to the fact that the 
Islamists were the only functionally organized opposition 
group that was actively engaged against an unpopular 
government. Also, the reaction by the government to the 
Islamist attacks was not always discriminating and 
frequently punished groups for the acts of individuals, 
further alienating the public. 
4. Mass-Based Uprisings 
The widespread uprising in 1980 and the battle in Hama 
in 1982 are two perfect examples of the large amount of 
public support that the Islamists were given.  The uprising 
in 1980 was instigated by the Muslim Brethren and merchants 
in Aleppo but they were soon joined by professional 
20Abd-Allah, p. 112. 
21 
associations such as the lawyers, engineers and doctors 
unions as well as leftist students from Aleppo University. 
The uprising was not just contained to Aleppo, either. It 
spread to the cities of Hama, Horns, Idlib, Latakia, Deir al- 
Zor, Ma'arrat-al-Nu'man and Jisr al-Shughur.  The public 
support of diverse groups behind the leadership of the 
Islamists brought images of another Iran-type revolution.21 
In 1982, when the Islamists attacked government troops 
and took control of Hama for three weeks, public support was 
again apparent in the size and nature of the uprising.  The 
uprising started when some Syrian soldiers searching for 
illegal arms stumbled into a Muslim Brotherhood headquarters 
and were attacked by those guarding it.  When the Brethren 
succeeded in pushing back the government troops, they 
continued pressing the attack and expanded to other targets. 
In a short time, the Muslim Brotherhood had taken control of 
the city buoyed by popular support.  In fact, during the 
subsequent governmental repression, there were several cases 
of Syrian soldiers deserting the army and joining the 
Islamist rebels although not on a large scale.22  However, 
while it was significant, the uprising in Hama did not 
spread to other cities as the one in Aleppo did two years 
earlier. 
2
^Hinnebusch, Authoritarian  Power and State  Formation  in Bathist Syria, 
p. 294. 
22Seale, p. 333. 
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E. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE 
The response to the Islamist rebellion by the Asad 
regime was one of massive and brutal repression.  In the 
initial phases of the jihad the repressive tactics were 
limited.   However, the Aleppo artillery school massacre 
marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the government 
to eliminate the Islamist opposition through military means, 
meeting violence with overwhelming counter-violence.  The 
effects of this policy on the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Islamic uprising were very apparent.  The government's 
campaign frightened away public support from the movement, 
divided and expelled the Islamist leadership, and eradicated 
the Islamist forces by turning the Syrian army on its own 
countrymen.  By May 1982 the Islamist rebellion and the 
Muslim Brotherhood had been obliterated. 
1. Massive Repression 
When the Muslim Brotherhood's jihad against the Asad 
regime began in 1976, Asad "seemed slow to react to the 
internal crisis, as if reluctant to admit that profound 
fissures existed in his society."23  The Aleppo artillery 
school massacre in June 1979 acted as a sort of wake up call 
to the Syrian government to the strength and reach of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  The reaction was the arrest of 300 
Brethren, of which 15 were executed.24 However, the 
Brotherhood continued its attacks on symbols of government 
23Seale,   p.   326. 
"Hmnebusch,   Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Bathist Syria, 
p.   294. 
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power such as police stations and party offices and the 
government became fully dedicated to a campaign of violence 
in response.  During the Seventh Regional Congress from 
December 1979 to January 1980, Rifat Asad, the president's 
younger brother who commanded the army's elite Defense 
Companies, swore he was ready "to fight 'a hundred wars, 
demolish a million strongholds, and sacrifice a million 
martyrs'"25to stop the Islamic insurgence.  The Aleppo 
uprising in March 1980 truly demonstrated the strength of 
public support for the Islamists, a very scary prospect for 
the Ba'thists in light of the recent events in Iran.  The 
response by the Asad regime was to send over 10,000 troops 
equipped with heavy weapons, tanks and helicopters into 
Aleppo.  The army encircled Aleppo with artillery and opened 
fire on the city.  There were no precise targets; the 
artillery was used as a means of destruction, to instill 
fear and soften up the opposition before troops were sent 
in.26 The army was expected to be ruthless: 
"...The troops were sent in at the beginning of 
April to seal off whole quarters and carry out 
house-to-house searches, often preceded by tank 
fire.  Hundreds of suspects were rounded up and 
carried away. Standing in the turret of his tank, 
the divisional commander, General Shafiq Fayadh, 
told the townspeople that he was prepared to kill 
a thousand men a day to rid the city of the vermin 
of the Muslim Brothers. His division stayed in 
>Seale, p. 327. 25c 
^Interview with LtCol. Terry Johnson, USA(Ret.)  Col. Johnson, a 
retired army intelligence officer, was stationed in Syria in 1980 and 
reported on the seige at Aleppo from the scene. 
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Aleppo for a whole year, with a tank in almost 
every street."27 
In all, about 25,000 troops were used to put down the 
uprising that had spread throughout the northern cities and 
hundreds of insurrectionists were killed.28 
The Muslim Brotherhood was not through, however, and 
made an assassination attempt on President Asad on 2 6 June 
1980 which he barely escaped with his life.  In response, 
early the next morning Rifat moved his Defense Companies 
into a prison in Palmyra that was full of Muslim Brethren. 
The soldiers were given orders to kill all the prisoners. 
About 500 inmates died in the massacre.29 
On 8 July 1980, in further response to the 
assassination attempt, Asad made membership in the Muslim 
Brotherhood a crime, punishable by death.  This had a 
dramatic effect on the strength of the Islamists, as over a 
thousand Brethren took advantage of a 50 day amnesty period 
to renounce their membership.  This blow seriously weakened 
the Brotherhood and was a factor in the decision to form the 
Islamic Front later that year.30 
Other tactics were used by the government to instill 
fear in the hearts of the Islamists and eliminate the 
opposition.  In late July 1980 the Syrian army attacked a 
Muslim Brotherhood training camp in Jordan.  In August 
27Seale, pp. 327-8. 
28Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation  in Bathist Syria, 
p. 295 and Drysdale, p. 8. 
29Seale, p. 329. 
30Munson, p. 92. 
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dozens of males over the age of fourteen suspected of 
belonging to the Brotherhood were rounded up and executed. 
In March 1981 Syrian assassins trying to kill exiled Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Isam al-Attar murdered his wife 
instead.31 
In February 1982 the regime's response to the uprising 
in Hama signaled the climax of the campaign against the 
Islamists and the end of the Islamist militant opposition. 
As in Aleppo two years earlier, Syrian troops were called in 
and armed with heavy weapons, tanks and helicopters.  The 
insurgents did not give in without a fight, though, and 
controlled the city, or parts of it, for three weeks.  The 
Syrian army was given the authority to use all force 
necessary to completely eliminate the Islamist opposition. 
Tanks were used to level whole neighborhoods, families were 
taken from their homes and shot, and many innocent people 
were buried alive in the rubble.  The battle for Hama turned 
into a bloodbath, wiping out the militant Islamists, their 
supporters and many innocent bystanders.  The total number 
of casualties will never be known but it is conservatively 
estimated that between 5000 and 10,000 people32, and 
possibly as high as 30,000, were killed in the assault.33 
The destruction of the city and the slaughter of those 
within left little doubt in the minds of the opposition left 
31Seale, p. 329. 
32Ibid,  pp. 333-4. 
33Moshe Ma'oz, "The Emergence of Modern Syria", Syria  Under Asad: 
Domestic Constraints  and Regional Risks   (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986) p. 32. 
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in the country that the government would and could do 
anything to stop the insurgents and remain in power. 
2. Effects of Governmental Response 
The repressive policies of the government paid big 
dividends.  The results of the governmental repression 
became apparent when, in October 1980, the announcement was 
made of the formation of a new group called the Islamic 
Front.  The loss of members due to Law 49, which made 
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense, was 
coupled with the loss of popular support to seriously weaken 
the Brotherhood.  "As the only organization with the 
discipline, training and experience to undertake military 
activity, the Brotherhood had over the years won the tacit 
support of most other opposition groups in Syria.. But as 
government reprisals became harsher and less discriminating, 
and especially in the wake of Hama this support began to 
melt away."34 The composition of the Islamic Front consisted 
of the weakened Muslim Brotherhood joined by other Islamist 
groups as well as groups that were not necessarily Islamist 
but did not object to the concept of an Islamic government. 
The group produced a proclamation which detailed the type of 
government that it planned on bringing about through 
revolution.  The political structure described in the 
proclamation was a democratic Islamic government that 
protected the basic freedoms of speech, assembly and 
34Judith Perera, "The Shifting Fortunes of Syria's Muslim Brothers", The 
Middle East  May 1993, p. 25. 
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religion.  It was an obvious attempt to regain lagging 
support for the opposition movement from secular groups. 
After the violent end of the Hama revolt the Muslim 
Brotherhood again tried to gain support by organizing a 
broad based opposition group.  By this time, however, the 
Brotherhood was so weakened by the government's repressive 
policies that it was forced to ally itself with very secular 
groups under the protection of Iraq, another Ba'thist 
regime.  The new group was called the National Alliance for 
Liberation of Syria and was basically a tool of the Iraqi 
government.  In any case, it has proven to be impotent since 
Syria has not experienced any more revolts since Hama. 
The military victory over the Islamists also created 
large rifts in the Muslim Brotherhood.  The members became 
unable to decide on a leader and the group divided into two 
factions, one based in Iraq and the other in Saudi Arabia. 
The military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood was also 
wiped out.  What little organization there was left after 
Hama was decapitated when its leader, Adnan Uqla, was lured 
back to Syria by a double agent and disappeared.35 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Islamist rebellion in Syria in the late 1970's and 
early 1980's had the potential to bring down the Asad regime 
and, some say, came close to doing so.  The failure of the 
35Chris Kutschera, "When the Brothers Fall Out", The Middle East  April 
1988, p. 21. 
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Syrian government to check the Islamist opposition at the 
beginning of its campaign of violence enabled the Muslim 
Brotherhood to gain a large membership as well as tacit 
support from a large section of the populace.  The Islamists 
were successful in drawing attention to the Alawi dominance 
in government and forcing the government to engage in 
collective punishment in response to Islamist attacks, which 
helped the Brotherhood gain support.  The attacks by the 
Islamists proved that the regime was vulnerable: Asad was 
very nearly assassinated and many other officials were not 
so lucky, including the 83 cadets at the artillery school. 
The dedication and leadership of the Brotherhood combined 
with the general discontent with the regime resulted in the 
mass based uprisings in Aleppo in 1980 and Hama in 1982, 
nearly engulfing the country in revolution. 
There are several reasons that the Islamists failed in 
their attempt at overthrowing the government.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood suffered from the lack of a single charismatic 
leader, such as Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.  Without such a 
leader, the Islamists became divided by internal squabbles 
and factionalism.  A contributing factor to their impotence 
is the fact that Asad forced them out of the country and 
they are now an expatriate organization.  Also, during the 
entire struggle between the Islamists and the regime, Asad 
retained the loyalty of the Syrian troops.  Other than some 
isolated desertions during the Hama uprising, the Syrian 
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army carried out its orders in attacks against fellow 
Syrians. 
The main reason why Asad was able to overcome the 
Islamist opposition in Syria was the complete devotion, 
unequivocal and single minded, to the brutal and violent 
elimination of the group by any and all means necessary. The 
Asad regime was able to break the back of the opposition 
through the uncompromising use of force and violence.  The 
numerous examples of police tactics against members of the 
Brotherhood such as large scale arrests, imprisonment and 
executions were used without hesitation but were not 
successful in ending  the opposition.  The uprisings in 
Aleppo and Hama, particularly the latter, provided the 
government with the opportunity to eliminate the Islamic 
insurgence.  The brutal and bloody razing of Hama wiped out 
the last stronghold of the Islamists and served as a signal 
to the rest of the country that violent opposition to the 
government is a deadly mistake.  After 1982 the Muslim 
Brotherhood ceased to exist in Syria and the rest of the 
population was frightened and bullied into submission. 
Since the devastation in Hama, there has not been another 
attempt at rebellion due to the fear generated by the 
extreme measures that were taken against the Muslim 
Brotherhood.   Certainly it was able to do these things 
because Syria is governed by an autocratic, even fascist, 
regime.  It does not have a liberal democracy and Asad has 
the ability to use extreme measures to maintain rule and 
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ensure peace and order.  Although the Syrian army has not 
had great success in its battles with the Israelis, it has 
been quite adequate for dealing with internal conflicts. 
Without liberal ideas like human rights and democracy to 
hold him back, Asad simply beat the offending animal with 
his biggest stick until it stopped moving. 
31 
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III. JORDAN: ASSIMILATION THROUGH CO-OPTATION 
A. APPLICATION TO THE EGYPTIAN CASE 
Islamist opposition in Jordan has existed for half a 
century but has not been marked by the violence that it has 
brought to Egypt.  The Islamist movement in Jordan can be 
characterized as a "loyal opposition" mainly due to the 
government's policy of co-optation.  Since he ascended to 
the throne in 1952, King Hussein has actively supported the 
Muslim Brotherhood by giving it a legal status and freedom 
to organize and conduct business.    In return, the Brethren 
have given support to the regime and have refrained from 
violence and plots against the government.  Instead, they 
have confined their disagreements with the regime to 
political discourse in the form of demonstrations and 
parliamentary debate.  As a result of the government's 
hands-off policy, the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest and 
most visible Islamist organization in Jordan, eclipsing the 
Islamic Liberation Party, an offshoot of the Brotherhood 
which advocates the violent overthrow of the monarchy. 
Islamists used the Brotherhood as a pseudo-political party 
for many years when parties were illegal under martial law 
to voice their opposition to the government on individual 
matters.  The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood remains 
antithetical to the nature of the regime, however, and must 
still be considered a political opposition group. 
Certainly, the relationship between the regime and the 
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Islamists has not been without its problems, it has waxed 
and waned over the years.  A major change in the 
relationship occurred in 1989 when parliamentary elections 
were held for the first time in 20 years.36 Candidates from 
the Muslim Brethren swept the elections and formed the 
largest bloc in parliament.  The king used legal techniques 
to retain what is essentially absolute political power and 
the Islamists proved they were willing to work within a 
democratic environment that gave them a voice in government. 
The Jordanian government's policies towards Islamist 
opposition demonstrate the possibilities of reducing violent 
opposition through the enfranchisement of Islamist groups. 
The level of cooperation between the regime and the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the confinement of Islamist groups to their 
role as a loyal opposition make the Jordanian model a 
relevant case study to compare with Egyptian situation.  The 
Jordanian government is quite different from that in Egypt 
and King Hussein has the advantage of having a certain 
amount of Islamic credibility that President Mubarak lacks. 
However, the Islamist opposition does exist within Jordan 
36The last national elections held prior to 1989 were in 1967.  In 1971, 
King Hussein postponed the regular elections citing the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank as an obstacle that must first be overcome 
before elections could again be held.  Then, in 1974, the Arab heads of 
state issued a joint decision that the PLO was the sole representative 
of the Palestinian people.  In response, King Hussein dissolved the 
Parliament and indefinitely suspended elections.  Parliament was 
replaced by a National Consultative Council (NCC) which could not make 
policy nor appove, amend or reject any bill.  Their function was simply 
to study, debate and give advice on bills proposed by the Council of 
Ministers.  In 1984, King Hussein recalled the House of Representatives 
that had been dismissed ten years earlier. Jordan:  Ä Country Study 
(Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1991) pp. 
189-90. 
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and King Hussein's heritage certainly does not entirely 
account for the lack of violent opposition from Jordanian 
Islamists.  There is undoubtedly enough similarity between 
Jordan and Egypt for the Jordanian case to provide some 
lessons for the Egyptian Islamist problem.  The Jordanian 
case provides an excellent example of successful co-optation 
of the opposition through inclusion.  The Islamists have 
refrained from violence and have actually become involved in 
the political process, thus associating themselves with the 
government.  By allowing the opposition to express their 
views in a political forum without the threat of repression, 
the regime in Jordan has effectively assimilated the 
Islamists into the political structure.  An analysis of 
Jordanian policies, therefore, may provide answers to the 
Egyptian Islamist dilemma. 
B. ISLAMIST OPPOSITION IN JORDAN 
Before discussing the current situation in Jordan, one 
must first have a basic understanding of the history and 
nature of Jordanian Islamism.  Islam has historically had a 
very strong following in Jordan, which has provided 
Islamists with a natural constituency and large recruiting 
pool.  Jordan (or TransJordan, as it was called prior to 
1967) is a traditionally conservative Muslim country which 
is much more religiously homogeneous than Syria or Egypt. 
Over 90 percent of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims, while only 
5-8 percent are Christian and the remainder of the 
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population is made up of a tiny number of Shi'a Muslims and 
assorted other religions.  The king, Hussein ibn Talal ibn 
Abdullah ibn Hussein al-Hashimi, is a practicing Muslim and 
claims descent from the Prophet, further cementing the 
Jordanian connection with Islam. 
1. Muslim Brotherhood 
Political Islamism made its appearance in Jordan in the 
mid-1940s when the Muslim Brotherhood opened branches in 
several Jordanian towns and cities.  The movement remained 
relatively nascent until the 1948 war with Israel when the 
Brotherhood's ranks grew exponentially with Muslims opposed 
to the creation of the Zionist state.  The Brotherhood also 
received a certain amount of popularity due to the fact that 
the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was a member 
of the Jerusalem branch.37 
The first general guide-of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan was Abd al-Latif Abu Qura who held extremely anti- 
Western views and, as a result, was closely watched by 
authorities.  He was replaced as general guide in 1953 by 
Abd al-Rahman Khalifa.  It was in 1953 that the Muslim 
Brotherhood applied for and was granted status as a legal 
organization from the Jordanian government.  Khalifa was the 
undisputed leader of the Brotherhood from 1954 until about 
1963 and was primarily responsible for the organization and 
spread of the movement in Jordan.  He organized the group's 
37Zaid Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in   the  West Bank  and Gaza:  Muslim 
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad,    (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994) p.3. 
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activities on a national level and increased coordination 
and cooperation between the various local branches.  It was 
under Khalifa's leadership that the Brotherhood first began 
to organize sporting events, put on plays, and set up 
political speeches and discussions.  The Brotherhood also 
created a youth scout organization which included 
instruction in the use of weapons.  The latter activity was 
a cause of concern for the authorities.  Although Khalifa 
never achieved the status of Hassan al-Banna, he was the 
most important figure during the first fifteen years of the 
Brotherhood's existence in Jordan He is considered the 
founding father of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and left 
a personal mark on the movement. -In 1963, when Yusuf al-Azm 
assumed the leadership role of the Brotherhood, Khalifa 
retained the honorary title of General Guide. 
While the loss by the Arab armies to the Israelis in 
the June 1967 War gave momentum to the Islamist movements in 
many Middle East countries, in Jordan it marked the rise of 
Palestinian nationalism.  The Jordanian Islamists did not 
enjoy the same rise in popularity and increase in 
participation that their counterparts did in Egypt. 
Instead, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
became a leader in the fight to regain Palestine from the 
Israelis and gained much support in Jordan where thousands 
of Palestinian refugees had fled from the West Bank. 
However, by the late 1970s, people were becoming 
disillusioned with Palestinian nationalism, pan-Arabism and 
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Marxism because they had all failed to solve the Palestinian 
problem.  As a result, Islamism began to gain support in 
Jordan.  The Muslim Brotherhood had positioned itself to 
take advantage of the shift in public sentiment.  In the 
late 1960s, it had begun to involve itself in activities 
such as Islamic charity associations, managing nursery 
schools and kindergartens, supervising religious schools, 
and establishing neighborhood sports clubs and libraries, 
all in an effort to spread its influence.  In the mid-1970s, 
after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, the Jordanian Brotherhood combined with the 
Brotherhoods in those territories to form the Muslim 
Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine.  The 
Brotherhoods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip receive 
guidance from the leadership in Jordan but each retain a 
certain amount of autonomy necessary to deal with their own 
particular situations.38  In 1980, the Muslim Brotherhood 
set up paramilitary camps in Jordan near the Syrian border 
for members of the Syrian Brotherhood who were attempting to 
bring down the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Asad. 
King Hussein supported the Brotherhood in this endeavor 
which drew the ire of Asad.  However, in 1985, when 
relations between Syria and Jordan warmed somewhat, King 
Hussein denounced the Brotherhood's involvement and jailed 
many known members.39  The year 1989 proved to be the 
38Ibid,  pp. 10-11. 
39Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The 
Islamic Response in Jordan", Islamic Fundamentalisms  and  the Gulf 
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turning point in the relationship between the king and the 
Islamists when he ordered parliamentary elections to be 
held, which gave the Brotherhood a large voice in the 
government. 
Although the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has received 
a certain amount of freedom, even support, from the monarchy 
and, in turn, has supported the regime during crises, it is 
still considered an Islamist opposition group.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood is ideologically opposed to the Jordanian 
constitution, which is modeled on that of France.   The 
Brotherhood believes that by relying on a form of government 
imported from the West, the regime separates the Jordanian 
people from their Islamic heritage.  Instead of being 
governed and judged by God's law the people are forced to 
use the laws of the infidel.40 However, the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood also focuses on the reform of the 
individual before the reform of society.  Once people have 
been freed from corruption, fear, ignorance and materialism, 
then social reform can be accomplished.  The Brotherhood 
believes this Islamic reawakening can be accomplished 
peacefully, without the use of violence or revolution.41 
Although the Brotherhood renounced violence as a means 
of social change, it has still opposed the regime on many 
Crisis,   James Piscatori, ed., (The Fundamentalism Project: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991) pp. 90-1. 
40Amnon Cohen, Political  Parties  in   the  West Bank  under  the  Jordanian 
Regime,   1949-1967,   (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) p. 180. 
41Emile Sahliyeh, In Search  of Leadership:   West Bank Politics  Since 
1967,   (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1988) p. 145 
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policies.  There are several examples of political 
opposition to the regime by the Brotherhood since their 
formation.  In fact, the Brotherhood has played an active 
role in Jordanian politics since the 1950s, frequently 
taking a position counter to the monarchy.  The first two 
general guides, Qura and Khalifa, were arrested several 
times for speaking out against the government and, at one 
point in 1955, Khalifa was forced to flee to Damascus to 
avoid arrest.  Each time either was arrested they were 
released shortly afterward.  The first instance of major 
opposition to the regime was in 1954 when demonstrations and 
a general strike were organized by the Muslim Brotherhood 
against the use of British officers in the Jordanian army. 
In fact, the leader of the army since 1930 was John Bagot 
Glubb, also known as Glubb Pasha, a British army officer. 
Any hint of Western influence was reason for the Brotherhood 
to rally against the regime. Another large demonstration 
against the government occurred in 1956 when King Hussein 
announced his intention to bring Jordan into the Baghdad 
Pact.  The announcement was met with outrage by the 
Islamists as well as by many secularists because it was 
sponsored by Britain and was therefore regarded as 
forfeiting Jordan's sovereignty to England.  Hussein bowed 
to public pressure and backed out of signing the Pact. 
Later that year he also dismissed the British officers from 
the Jordanian army, including Glubb Pasha, an act which was 
perceived as throwing off the yoke of British imperialism 
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once and for all.  In 1958, the Brotherhood launched a 
political attack on the regime when Jordan became more 
closely tied to the United States, partially as a result of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine.  The government responded by again 
arresting the general guide, a move that prompted mass 
demonstrations in the city of Nablus on the West Bank.  The 
regime placed the organization under tight surveillance but 
took no further overt action.42  That same year, the 
Brotherhood publically opposed the Jordanian request for 
British military assistance during the crisis after the 
Iraqi revolution.  Again, the opposition was non-violent and 
was not repressed by the government.43 
After 1958, most of the Brotherhood's opposition to the 
regime revolved around domestic policy.  In 1960 they 
protested against the government's decision to allow an ice 
ballet company to perform in the country.  It was seen as an 
example of the government's indifference to moral standards. 
As a result, several members of the movement including the 
general guide were arrested that year.44  Other demands made 
upon the government by the Muslim Brotherhood included the 
forbidding of government officials to drink wine in public, 
barring of women to hold government office, and banning of 
any form of entertainment perceived as immoral.  In 1965 
several members of the Brotherhood were arrested for 
42Cohen, p. 150. 
43Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan", 
Survival  vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995) p. 141. 
44Cohen, p. 151. 
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planning to demonstrate outside cinemas and other places of 
entertainment that provided immoral fare. Much of the 
opposition to the government occurred in Parliament where 
the Islamists had several elected representatives.  In 1961 
the Islamist representatives opposed the budget for the 
Jordanian broadcasting services due to the belief that they 
played immoral songs and music.  In 1963, three Islamist 
representatives gave a vote of nonconfidence in the king's 
cabinet for failing to apply the shariah to Jordanian law 
and enforce Islamic moral values, failing to keep Jordan out 
of the Western sphere of influence and failing to persevere 
in the jihad against Israel.45 
2. Islamic Liberation Party 
The non-violent nature of the Muslim Brotherhood's 
activities and the willingness to work with the government 
gave them the label of "loyal opposition."  In 1952, a group 
which was more violently opposed to the regime and believed 
that the Brotherhood was no longer faithful to the tenets of 
Islam broke away and formed their own Islamist organization 
called the Islamic Liberation Party.  The new group was 
formed and led by Taqi al-Din Nabhani, a former Muslim 
Brother who advocated the overthrow of the Hashemite regime 
and the establishment of a Caliphate in its place.46 The 
ideology of the group is totally pan-Islamic, they oppose a 
separate Palestinian state and advocate the reform of 
45JJbid,   pp.   151-184. 
46Tal,   p.   153   (endnote  no.   3). 
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society to a proper Islamic way of life according to the 
Qu'ran and the shariah through intellectual and political 
revolution. 
The Islamic Liberation Party has never achieved the 
status or size of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Restrictions by 
the government, the popularity of the Brotherhood among 
Islamists, infiltration by Jordanian intelligence and the 
setbacks during the first decade of the group's existence, 
are all obstacles that the organization has never really 
overcome.47  The group applied for permission to establish a 
political party in the same manner as the Brotherhood but 
was turned down.  The reason for the disapproval of the 
application was because the proposed party's platform called 
for an elected leader, embraced Islam as the basis of the 
state and, therefore, was contrary to the Jordanian 
constitution.  Undaunted, the group publicly declared its 
intention to form an association by taking advantage of the 
Ottoman laws still in effect in the West Bank which allowed 
associations to be formed without permission from the 
government.  The regime responded by arresting the members 
of the group.48  In fact, the government was well aware of 
the group's beliefs and considered it a threat to the 
regime.  As a result, tactics such as arrest, expulsions and 
legal restrictions were used to hinder the group's 
activities and growth. 
A1Ibid,   p. 140. 
48Cohen, pp. 209-10. 
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Organization efforts were slow; not many Islamists were 
willing to leave the Muslim Brotherhood which had legal 
status and a larger membership to join the new group, which 
was outlawed.  To make matters worse, the organization was 
further weakened by internal dissension.  Although Nabhani 
was the undisputed leader, he was forced to leave the 
country and had to issue orders from Damascus and Beirut 
which weakened his ability to organize and lead.  The group 
tried to expand and work towards its goal of overthrowing 
the regime by preaching its message at the mosques and 
teaching its message in the schools, particularly in the 
West Bank.  "Not only did preaching provide the party with a 
regular, broadly based audience; it also made the party's 
influence appear to extend well beyond its actual 
membership, and authorities viewed this apparent influence 
with concern...As self confidence increased, the party began 
to ignore repeated warnings issued by the authorities, and 
even began to incite the congregation against the regime."49 
As a result, the government made it illegal to preach or 
teach at a mosque without prior permission.  Also, many 
members of the organization were schoolteachers and used 
their positions to recruit students.  The government again 
clamped down on the group and banned the use of political 
materials in the classroom.50 
49Ibid,  pp.214-5. 
50Ibid,   p. 217. 
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The group was severely hampered by these restrictions 
and its influence waned.  The group found itself restricted 
to distributing leaflets and holding study groups comprised 
of 5-10 members in private homes.  The study groups were 
forums for the dissemination of party doctrine as well as 
Islamic teaching.  The leadership of the party resorted to a 
gradualist approach, i.e. slowly build up support and 
strength of the party instead of looking for a quick 
solution.  It also attempted to achieve its goals by working 
within the framework of the constitution and putting its own 
candidates up for election.  The party put up candidates for 
the 1954 and 1956 elections but only one was elected each 
time, Ahmad al-Daur, who ran with the added support of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  He was later expelled from the House of 
Representatives and put in prison for two years for 
subversion.  The Islamic Liberation Party refrained from 
contesting any further elections.51  Since their formation 
the Islamic Liberation Party has had little impact on 
Jordanian politics. 
The relationship between the two Islamist groups was 
antagonistic although there were early discussions of 
unification.  The Islamic Liberation Party envied the legal 
status that the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed and used to its 
advantage.  Talks of unification were pointless, however, 
because basic ideological differences could not be overcome. 
The Islamic Liberation Party attacked the Muslim Brotherhood 
51Ibid,   p. 216. 
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for its contacts with the government, calling the Brethren 
collaborators with an illegal monarchy.52  The Brethren 
responded by saying that the Islamic Liberation Party did 
not represent true Islam.  All in all, the Muslim Brethren 
were not threatened by the upstart party.  Their legal 
status gave them a major advantage over the Islamic 
Liberation Party and the attacks on their loyalty did not do 
much harm to their credibility. 
C. CO-OPTATION OF THE ISLAMISTS 
The Jordanian monarchy's co-optation of the Islamic 
opposition involved a quid pro quo  arrangement: the regime 
extended a legal status to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
allowed it to function as a political party while the Muslim 
Brotherhood allowed itself to be co-opted by remaining loyal 
to the regime while opposing specific policies and 
supporting the regime when it was necessary.  As a result, 
both sides benefited from the relationship in many ways, 
including the marginalization of common enemies such as 
communists and providing mutual legitimacy by each 
recognizing and cooperating with the other. 
1. Methods of Co-optation 
The main tool that the regime used for co-opting the 
Islamists was the legalization of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
52Glenn E. Robinson, "The Islamist Movement in Jordan Under 
Liberalization", Different Aspects  of Islamic Fundamentalism: 
Theoretical   Issues  and Case Studies,  Ahmad Moussalli, ed., (University 
of Florida Press, forthcoming) p. 10. 
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The government gave the Islamists a stake in the system by 
giving the Islamists a voice to express their disagreement 
and a forum to oppose government policy without resorting to 
violence.  The freedom to organize and function as legal 
party gave the Muslim Brotherhood a special status because, 
although it was technically a religious and social 
organization, it did involve itself in politics.  The 
Brotherhood, therefore, had the distinction and advantage of 
being the only legal political party after political parties 
were banned in 1957, and made illegal in 1967.  The 
Brotherhood responded positively to this by engaging in 
activities that were not detrimental to the regime; they 
opposed specific policies but supported the regime overall. 
An example is the support they gave Hussein in 1957 during a 
coup attempt by Hussein's prime minister and elements of the 
army.  The Brotherhood rallied behind Hussein despite their 
political differences including a major one over the Baghdad 
Pact the previous year. 
2. Willingness to be Co-opted 
The special status accorded them by the regime and the 
accompanying voice it gave them in government were not the 
only reasons that the Muslim Brotherhood supported the 
regime.  Another reason for their willingness to be co-opted 
was that the Islamic nature of the regime itself enabled 
them to rationalize and defend their relationship with the 
government.  King Hussein is a practicing Muslim and is very 
public about his faith, often being seen on Jordanian 
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television praying at a local mosque.  More importantly, 
King Hussein is a member of the Hashemite family which 
traces its descent direct from the Prophet Muhammed (through 
his daughter, Fatima) whose tribe was Al Quraish and whose 
clan was Al Hashim.53 Hussein's ancestry and personal 
public observance of his Muslim faith provide the Islamists 
with a rationale for the support of his regime even though 
it does not exactly fit their ideal. 
3. Intimidation: Loyalty of the Military 
King Hussein's heritage was also a large factor'in the 
loyalty of his armed forces.  When Glubb Pasha arrived in 
Jordan in 1930, he began fill the ranks of the Arab Legion 
(the predecessor of the Jordanian Arab Army) with recruits 
from bedouin tribes.  The bedouins placed a high value on 
the king's ancestry and common nomadic heritage.  As a 
result, the Arab Legion began a tradition of a highly 
disciplined and fiercely loyal organization.  This proved to 
be instrumental in the Hashemite regime's ability to remain 
in power, providing it with the necessary force to put down 
insurgency in a time of crisis.  The best example of such a 
time was in 1970 when a rebellion by Palestinian refugees 
which came to be known as "Black September" threatened to 
bring down the monarchy.  The Palestinians had organized 
commando units that conducted raids into Israel.  Israel 
responded in kind, forcing the Jordanian army to fight 
53james Lunt, Hussein of Jordan,   (London: MacMillan London, Ltd., 1989) 
p.xxi. 
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alongside the Palestinian instigators.  The commandos set up 
bases in several major towns with the headquarters in Amman. 
They began to enforce their own rules and security measures 
on the local population.  On September 16 the Palestinians 
were ordered to disarm but refused.  The resulting battle 
between Jordanian troops and Palestinian commandos 
essentially amounted to a civil war.  Finally, the army 
destroyed the commando bases and forced the Palestinian 
insurgents into Lebanon. At the time, about forty percent of 
the army was composed of Palestinians, however, the loyal 
tradition of the organization had been so firmly established 
that there was no hesitation in putting down the rebellion, 
killing thousands of Palestinians in the process.  Members 
of the Brotherhood fought alongside the Jordanian troops 
against the PLO forces.54 At the same time, the Syrian army 
invaded Jordan in an attempt to aid the Palestinians but was 
also defeated by the Jordanian army.55 Black September was 
not only a big victory for the Jordanian army, but also a 
demonstration for the Islamists of what they could expect if 
they ever became a violent opposition to the government. 
The loyalty and discipline of the army is undoubtedly a 
intimidating factor and an incentive for the Islamists to 
remain non-violent. 
54Stephen C. Pelletiere, A  Theory of Fundamentalism:  An  Inquiry into  the 
Origin  and Development  of the Movement   (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 1995) p. 25. 
55Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank:   Jordan and  the Prospects for Peace, 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1986) pp. 75-84. 
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4. Political Participation 
In 1988, King Hussein made a decision to renounce all 
Jordanian claims to the West Bank which paved the way for 
new elections.  Other factors in the decision to hold new 
elections were the Intifada in the Occupied Territories in 
1987 and the widespread discontent in Jordan with Prime 
Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i and his cabinet in 1988.56 
In 1989,  elections were held for the first time in 
twenty years in Jordan.  Although the elections were not 
part of the co-optation scheme of the regime, the government 
has since used them to further reduce the threat from the 
Islamist camp.  The landslide victories of Islamist 
candidates in the 1989 elections caught the regime off 
guard, but changes were later implemented in the electoral 
system that reduced the Islamist's influence in government 
while still allowing them a significant voice. 
The elections were a windfall for the Islamists who won 
thirty-two seats, twenty by members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and twelve by independent Islamist candidates. 
The success of Islamists in the elections was partially a 
result of popular support and partially a result of the 
advantage that the Muslim Brotherhood had of being the only 
legal party in the country.  The Brotherhood was much better 
organized and prepared for political campaigns than any of 
its competitors, which paid huge dividends.  Although the 
^Michael Collins Dunn, "Islamist Parties in Democratizing States: A 
Look at Jordan and Yemen", Middle East Policy  vol.11, no. 2 (1993) p. 
18. 
50 
Islamists were by far the largest single bloc of elected 
representatives, they did not achieve a majority of the 
parliament.  However, the non-Islamist electees were forced 
to form a coalition in order to defeat the Islamists on many 
issues.57 
During the Persian Gulf War the stock of the Islamists 
rose when their anti-Western stance gained widespread 
popular appeal among Jordanians and Palestinians alike.  The 
presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the land of the 
Islamic holy places of Mecca and Medina, outraged many 
Jordanians.  The Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, was 
perceived as a tough Muslim standing up to the American 
bully.  King Hussein was caught between the Scylla of his. 
Western ties and external pressure to support the coalition 
against Saddam and the Charybdis of internal popular 
pressure to support Iraq against the "great Satan."  The 
resulting support for the Muslim Brotherhood and fellow 
Islamists gave them even more political power.  Their 
growing power was evidenced in 1990 when the first Islamist 
Speaker of the House of Representative was elected.  Then, 
in January 1991 King Hussein appointed seven Islamists to 
the Cabinet.  To three of them he gave the Ministries of 
Education, Religious Affairs, and Social Development.  These 
positions gave the Islamists considerable power and 
influence over domestic affairs but kept what are considered 
the more important ministries, namely Defense, State, 
5
'Robinson, p. 2. 
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Foreign Affairs and Information, in hands of secular 
loyalists.  As it turned out, the appointments only lasted 
six months; several policies proposed by the Islamist 
cabinet members such as separate classrooms for each gender 
and banning alcohol throughout the country were considered 
too radical, and the Cabinet was dissolved with no Islamists 
being appointed to its successor.58 
Another setback during the initial term in office for 
the newly elected Islamists was the arrest and trial of 
Layth al-Shubaylat, a popular Islamist representative from 
Amman's third district.  Shubaylat began hearings on 
corruption in the government under the previous prime 
minister, Zayd al-Rifa'i.  Rampant corruption was exposed by 
the hearings and Rifa'i came extremely close to being 
indicted.  However, during a recess Shubaylat was arrested 
and charged with conspiring with Iranians to overthrow the 
Jordanian government.  The charges were most surely 
fraudulent and the trial a political tactic to get Shubaylat 
out of the way and teach the rest of the Islamists a lesson 
about the bounds of political opposition in Jordan. After 
being tried in military court and found guilty, Shubaylat 
was sentenced to death.  King Hussein pardoned Shubaylat 
shortly after the sentencing but the point had been made.59 
Elections were held again in 1993 but there were many 
differences from the elections four years earlier and the 
58Milton-Edwards, p. 106. 
5
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Islamists did not do quite as well as before.  The field of 
candidates was much larger than it was in 1989 and, since 
political parties were legalized in 1992, there were 
nineteen other parties which put up candidates to compete 
with those of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) , the official 
political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.60 Also, in 1993 
the Islamists were no longer riding the crest of popularity 
that had existed during the Gulf War.  The biggest 
difference, however, was the change in election law 
implemented by King Hussein that reduced support for the 
Islamists. 
The new election law, known as the "one person, one 
vote" law, reduced the support for the Islamist party 
candidates and increased support for local and tribal 
candidates.  As described by Abla Amawi: 
"The law in effect during the 1989 elections 
designated a specific number of seats for each of 
the country's twenty electoral districts, and gave 
each voter a number of votes equal to the number 
of seats designated for his/her district.  Thus, 
the voter in Amman's second district cast three 
ballots for the three designated seats in that 
district, while a voter in the Irbid governorate 
voted for nine candidates corresponding to its 
nine designated seats.  By contrast, the change in 
the electoral law allowed only one vote for each 
voter, regardless of the number of seats 
designated for his/her district.  Therefore, a 
voter in Amman's second district would vote only 
for one candidate under the new law."61 
60Abla M. Amawi, "The 1993 Elections in Jordan", Arab Studies Quarterly 
vol.16, no.3 (Summer 1994) p.17. 
61Ibid,   p. 16. 
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This measure forced voters in many cases to choose between 
casting their ballot for a candidate from their tribe or for 
a candidate backed by a party.  Realizing that all politics 
were indeed local and they would lose in many cases, the IAF 
and sixteen other parties protested the law change.  The 
King was adamant, though, and refused to budge.  The result 
was that the IAF candidates won sixteen seats and 
independent Islamists won six additional seats for a total 
of twenty-two, ten shy of the previous total but still a 
substantial bloc62. 
The overall effect of democratization through the 
holding of elections with regards to the co-optation of the 
Islamists was further assimilation into the bureaucratic 
process and a greater stake in the Jordanian government. 
The Islamists proved that they were a powerful political 
group and gained the largest voice they have ever had in 
Jordanian politics.  However, the King still retained 
ultimate political power and succeeded in cementing the 
Brotherhood's role as loyal opposition. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Jordanian regime's'co-optation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood has been successful due to several factors but 
mainly because it has been beneficial to both sides.  King 
Hussein has used policies designed to co-opt the Islamists 
in order to strengthen his own political power and the 
62Robinson, pp.3-4. 
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Islamists have been willing to be co-opted for the same 
reason. 
The unspoken quid pro quo  that has existed between the 
monarchy and the Islamists for over 40 years has provided 
each side with a certain amount of legitimacy.  The 
recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime gave 
that organization the freedom to engage in activities which 
benefitted itself as well as the community.  In return, the 
position taken by the Brotherhood as loyal opposition and 
supporter of the regime in crisis gave the sometimes shaky 
government a more solid foundation upon which to rule. 
Also, the other alternative, violent opposition, has not 
been a viable or attractive option for the Islamists 
considering the Jordanian army's loyalty to King Hussein and 
discipline, both demonstrated in several instances, 
particularly in the quashing of the Palestinian uprising in 
1970.  Violent opposition, therefore, would invite 
repression from the army, a mission they have proved 
themselves capable of, and a prospect that the Islamists do 
not want to consider. 
The legalization of the Brotherhood allowed the 
Islamists to act openly without fear of repression but also 
allowed the regime to keep a close eye on what could be a 
potential threat.  The legal status of the Brotherhood and 
resulting advantage over other opposition groups that were 
outlawed for many years has made it the organization of 
choice of most Jordanian Islamists.  The result is that the 
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Muslim Brotherhood has enjoyed a large membership and the 
government has channeled potential extremists into a 
moderate organization. 
Finally, the co-optation of the Islamists has allowed 
the government and the Islamists to counterbalance mutual 
enemies in the form of secular opposition such as 
Nasserists, Communists and Ba'thists.  In this respect, a 
strong Muslim Brotherhood which supported the regime was 
good for both the government and the Islamists. 
King Hussein has proven himself to be a very shrewd and 
resilient leader during his reign.  His policies of co- 
optation of the Islamists have been some of his most astute. 
By enfranchizing the Islamists, giving them a voice in 
government and, thereby, giving them a stake in the 
political process, he has ensured their loyalty to the 
regime.  The elections in 1989 and 1993 have proven that the 
Islamists are willing to participate in a democratic 
government even when they do not always get their way.  It 
is obvious that King Hussein still holds political control 
in Jordan, but the Islamists will overlook actions taken to 
cement his control as long as they are still allowed to have 
some input into the way things are run. 
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IV. ALGERIA: GOVERNMENTAL VACILLATION 
A. APPLICATION TO THE EGYPTIAN CASE 
When compared to Islamist movements in other countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa, the Algerian Islamist 
movement is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Although the 
largest Algerian Islamist party, Islamic Salvation Front 
(known by its French acronym, FIS), was first formed in 1989 
as a result of the government's policy of political 
liberalization, it quickly gained massive popular support 
and won a landslide political victory just one year later in 
the 1990 local elections.  The move towards democratization 
was made by the government to placate popular dissent with 
the country's economic situation, divide the opposition and 
regain the legitimacy that it had lost since independence 
from France in 1963.  However, the meteoric rise of the 
movement caught the government and especially the army, off 
guard.  As a result, the government vacillated between 
repression and conciliation in its policies toward the new 
opposition which only served to increase the strength of the 
Islamists and decrease the legitimacy of the regime. 
Finally, when the Islamists became so strong that they 
threatened to take over the government through democratic 
elections, the army moved in to restore authoritarianism. 
However,, the Islamists were not willing to stand idly by and 
let the army snatch political victory from their grasp, so 
they took up arms against what they considered to be an 
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illegitimate government.  As a result, since 1992, Algeria 
has been fighting a civil war: on one side is the military 
backed regime and on the other is the democratically elected 
but subsequently outlawed Islamic Salvation Front. 
The Algerian situation is particularly applicable to 
the Egyptian case because it provides a picture of what 
Egypt's future may hold.  If Egypt does not adopt a policy 
of absolute repression as in Syria, nor one of co-optation 
as in Jordan, but instead vacillates between repressive 
policies and conciliation, then it may find itself in a 
civil war a la  Algeria.  The vacillation on the part of the 
Algerian government is the cause for its civil strife and 
Egypt could fall into the same trap if it cannot decide on a 
single policy to deal with its own Islamist opposition.  The 
situations in Algeria and Egypt are very similar: 
deteriorating economy, widespread unemployment (and 
underemployment), disaffected youth, and a military backed 
regime.  Also, both countries have a significant Islamist 
opposition that has been denied a legitimate political 
voice. 
B. RISE OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN ALGERIA 
Although Algeria is a Muslim country, Islamic extremism 
has not been a major movement until recently.  The 
authoritarian regimes established by Houari Boumediene and 
his successor, Chadli Bendjedid, were successful in 
repressing political opposition until 1988 when socio- 
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economic conditions in the country forced Bendjedid to 
change the Constitution and make Algerian politics a 
multiparty system.  The combination of widespread 
dissatisfaction and political liberalization led to the rise 
of Algerian Islamism. 
1. From the Revolution to 1978 
During the War for Independence, Islam acted as a 
unifying force for Algerians in their battle against the 
French.  Algerians demonstrated their opposition to French 
rule and solidarity with one another by observing Islamic 
tenets: women wore traditional Islamic garb and mosques were 
filled with worshippers.  However, the revolution was not a 
fight to establish an Islamic state and, therefore, fell 
short of an Islamist movement.  Instead, Islam was used as a 
nationalistic tool by the National Liberation Front (FLN) in 
the fight for independence.  It served as a source of 
cultural identity and differentiation from the French.  In 
fact, the slogan used by the Algerians was, "Islam is my 
religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my homeland!"63 
The underlying secular nature of the revolution became 
apparent after Algeria achieved independence and Houari 
Boumediene took power in 1965 and established a socialist, 
authoritarian regime. 
There was little Islamist activity or protest during 
Boumediene's regime for several reasons: socialist policies 
63Azzedine Layachi and Abdel-Kader Haireche, "National Development and 
Political Protest: Islamists in the Maghreb Countries", Arab Studies 
Quarterly  vol. 14, nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1992) p. 72. 
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spread the wealth among the population, government was 
centralized under authoritarian rule, the FLN was the only 
legal party and its leadership was monopolized by those with 
revolutionary credentials or technocratic experience, 
political dissent was not tolerated, and the economy was 
very strong.  In addition, the government made an effort to 
co-opt Islam by making it the state religion in 1976. 
The tight grip on political control and lack of 
toleration for political dissent by Boumediene did not cause 
much protest among the Islamists, partially due to the fact 
that political protest was repressed, but mainly due to the 
fact that the Algerian economy was very strong.  Algerians 
were economically prosperous during the Boumediene regime 
due to its socialist nature and the abundance of oil and 
natural gas revenues.  Between 1967 and 1978 the Algerian 
economy boomed: the number of jobs increased from 1,750,000 
to 2,830,000, the economy grew by an average of 8.6 percent 
a year, and per capita income increased from $375 to $830. 
Since Algerians had ample educational and work opportunities 
as well as free medical care and food subsidies, they had 
very little to protest about.64  In effect, Algeria was a 
rentier state where the people had little political voice 
but were taken care of by a beneficent authoritarian regime 
with income from the sale of natural resources.  What little 
protest there was from the Islamists concentrated on social 
issues such as alcohol distribution, coed -education and 
6iIbid,  pp. 73-4. 
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women's fashions.  As a result, Boumediene co-opted the 
secular and leftist groups to help promote his plans for 
modernization.  By emphasizing the Western orientation of 
his policies to these groups, he garnered their support and 
used it to counterbalance the non-progressive groups, namely 
the Islamists.65 
Not all of Boumediene's economic policies were 
successful, although the bad effects were not readily 
noticeable to the majority of the population.  While he 
pushed the development of Algeria's industrial sector, he 
ignored other aspects of the economy, particularly the 
agricultural sector.  As a result, the revenues from oil and 
natural gas exports paid for investment in industry but 
Algeria became dependent on food imports and was faced with 
a growing national debt. 
2. 1979 to 1988 
President Boumediene died in December 1978 and in early 
1979 he was succeeded by Chadli Bendjedid, a military 
commander from the Oran District.  Bendjedid had been a 
loyal supporter of Boumediene and was expected to continue 
the former president's economic policies.  Instead, he 
instituted a number of economic reforms with the intention 
of liberalizing the economy.  Bendjedid believed that a 
diversified economy that was not dependent on oil and gas 
revenues was necessary for economic stability and 
modernization.  The large industrial public sector was 
65Jjbid, p. 74. 
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reorganized by breaking up the state-owned enterprises and 
giving the private sector a greater role in agriculture and 
industry.  For example, SONATRACH, Algeria's largest state- 
owned company, was divided up into 13 smaller companies and 
investment in industry dropped from 59 percent of total 
investment to 38.6 percent while investment in agriculture 
grew from 4.7 percent to 11.7 percent.66 
Unfortunately, the reforms only served to create an 
economic quagmire.  When public industries were privatized 
and bureaucracies were reorganized in an effort to improve 
efficiency, profit and production became much more important 
than they had been before.  Many managers who were 
inexperienced with competitive markets chose simply to. 
increase the prices of their products, sometimes as much as 
50 to 200 percent overnight, making inflation grow at an 
annual rate of 42 percent.  Unemployment skyrocketed to 22 
percent.  Young workers were the hardest hit and 7 0 percent 
found themselves without jobs.  To make matters worse, world 
oil prices fell in the mid-1980s and in 1985-86 Algerian oil 
revenues dropped 21 percent.  By the end of 1988, eight out 
of every ten reformed state corporations were in debt.67 
The sinking economy also made it impossible for the 
government to continue its welfare policies which 
intensified the negative effects of the economic reforms 
among the lower classes.  Those who still had jobs lost 
66John Ruedy, Modern Algeria,    (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992)   pp.   233-4. 
67Layachi   and Haireche,   p.   75. 
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their social benefits, the black market was rampant, and 
food and housing shortages became a problem. 
Political opposition by Islamist groups began to 
surface during the economic hardships of the 1980s.  In 
1982, a major strike and demonstration by students at the 
University of Algiers calling for a ban of alcohol were held 
before being put down by the police.  Also in 1982, a group 
of anti-government Islamists known as the Algerian Islamist 
Movement, was formed.  Other than its existence and the fact 
that many of its members were arrested after a cache of arms 
and explosives was found in a police raid in December 1982, 
the group did not do much that was noteworthy.  The leader, 
Mustafa Bouyali, was killed in a police ambush in 1987. 
By 1988, the people had become entirely disillusioned 
with the reforms and the government itself.  As long as the 
Algerian economy had been booming, the people were willing 
to live without much political voice.  However, after the 
economy began to disintegrate due to Bendjedid's reforms and 
the poor oil market, the people would no longer remain 
quiet.  Basically, Algeria had ceased to function as a 
rentier state. Protests by students began as early as 1986 
and labor joined them in 1987.  However, by 1988 the economy 
was at its worst and in September an epidemic of strikes hit 
the country.  In early October, rumors of a major strike 
were circulating throughout Algiers, but the strike did not 
materialize.  On  5 October rioting began in the streets of 
Algiers as thousands of young men attacked and destroyed 
63 
symbols of authority, wealth and consumption.  The rioting 
spread to other cities the next day.  On 6 October the 
government declared a state of emergency and called in the 
army to restore order. The army was brutal in its 
suppression of the riots; between 250 and 500 people were 
killed and thousands more were taken into custody, many of 
which were tortured.  Although the army had gained control 
of the streets by 10 October, the massive opposition 
embodied by the riots had grown.68 
3. Outcome of the 1988 Riots: Rise of FIS 
As a result of the riots, Bendjedid made some 
significant concessions.  On 3 November, less than a month 
after the start of the riots, Bendjedid called for a 
national referendum to revise the 1976 Constitution.  The 
action was not entirely altruistic; Bendjedid saw that his 
own legitimacy was shaky and saw this as a way to solidify 
his position while, at the same time, dividing the 
opposition and weakening the military.  He personally 
oversaw the revision to ensure that it was a reform from 
above and he controlled the nature of its contents.  The new 
Constitution was approved by referendum in February 1989 
with 73.43 percent voter approval.69  The new document made 
no mention of the leading role of the FLN and made the 
Algerian politics a multiparty system.  In addition, it 
68Ruedy, p. 249. 
69Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Painful Transition from Authoritarianism in 
Algeria", Arab Studies  Quarterly  vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1993) p. 90. 
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reduced the function of the military to strictly national 
defense, taking away its political and economic functions. 
The new Constitution guaranteed the basic freedoms of 
expression, association and assembly, but, most importantly, 
it gave citizens the right to form political parties. 
The intended result of these revisions was a 
pluralistic political field which pitted different 
opposition groups against each other, taking some of the 
heat off the government.  However, what President Bendjedid 
did not foresee was the rise in popularity of the Islamist 
movement.  FIS was formed in February 1989 and in September 
filed an application for recognition as a political party. 
The platform of the new party was the implementation of'the 
shariah as the legal code.  Although the law regarding 
political associations contained verbiage that prevented the 
"foundation of parties whose creation or action rests 
exclusively on a religious, linguistic or regionalist basis" 
Bendjedid wasted no time in approving the request.70 FIS 
immediately won a large following.  It presented itself as 
the "son" of FLN (a pun using the pronunciation of the 
French acronym FIS which sounds like the French word for 
son, "fils") and its successor as the leader in the fight 
for national pride. Most of its supporters were part of the 
underprivileged element in Algerian society, particularly 
the unemployed. 
70Law 89-11, Article 5 cited in Zoubir, p. 90. 
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The leaders of the new Islamist party were Dr. Abasi 
Madani and Ali Belhadj, two well-known Islamist activists. 
Madani, born in 1931, had been one of the founding members 
of the FLN and was imprisoned during most of the revolution. 
He received a Ph.D. in Educational Sciences at the 
University of London in 1978, was imprisoned from 1982 to 
1984 for participation in the strikes and demonstrations at 
the University of Algiers in November 1982, and had been a 
teacher at the Institute of Educational Sciences at 
Bouzareah since 1984.  Western educated and married to an 
Englishwoman, Madani represents and appeals to, the less 
violent and extreme Islamist elements in Algeria.   Belhadj 
was born in 1956 and was orphaned when his parents were 
killed in the War for Independence.  He received a religious 
education and began preaching after graduation.  Between 
1982 and 1987 he was imprisoned for subversive activities, 
namely being associated with an anti-government Islamic 
group, the Algerian Islamist Movement, led by Mustafa 
Bouyali.  Belhadj is the more militant and fundamentally 
dogmatic of the two leaders.  Madani was chosen to be 
president of the new party and Belhadj was picked to be vice 
president.  Although they do not see eye-to-eye, their 
different views complement each other by accommodating the 
widest range of Islamist support possible for their party. 
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C. FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
Regardless of Bendjedid's motives for liberalizing 
Algeria's political system, events proved that he was 
willing to support the democratic process even if it meant 
giving up power.  The army, however, proved that they were 
unwilling to allow the Islamists to control the government, 
even if it was the will of the people. 
1. 1990 Local Elections 
President Bendjedid promised elections would be held in 
1990.  FIS called for elections for the National Assembly 
but Bendjedid started at the local level.  The first free 
elections in Algeria since independence took place on 12 
June 1990 to choose local and provincial leaders.  The 
results were a shock to everyone: with a voter turnout of 65 
percent, FIS won control of 853 of the 1551 municipal 
councils and 32 of the 48 wilayas,   or departments. It 
received the majority of votes in all of Algeria's large 
cities: 64 percent in Algiers, 70 percent in Oran and 72 
percent in Constantine and gained control of every municipal 
council in four wilayas.71 The results were a huge 
disappointment to Bendjedid, the FLN, and the army, all of 
which despised the Islamists.  However, a smooth transition 
to FIS control was effected at the local level, which was an 
encouraging sign that democratization was going to work. 
71Francois Burgat and William McDowell, The  Islamic Movement  in North 
Africa,    (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas 
at Austin, 1993) pp. 279-80. 
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Algerians received a dose of reality soon after the FIS 
electees took office.  Regardless of their popularity and 
intentions, the candidates proved that they were 
inexperienced and support for FIS ebbed as many of the new 
officials governed with less effectiveness than those they 
had replaced.  It began to look as if Bendjedid had taken a 
gamble, in that by allowing the Islamists to fill some 
government offices, he was giving them enough rope to hang 
themselves. 
By early 1991, FIS popularity was at a low point.  Not 
only had it become apparent that the FIS candidates elected 
to office in the local elections were poor managers, but FIS 
had given strong public support to Saddam Hussein in the 
Gulf War.  The quick and decisive rout of Iraqi forces by 
the international coalition led by American troops made FIS 
look somewhat foolish in the eyes of Algerians and cost it 
much popular support.72 Despite this fact, FIS continued to 
call for parliamentary elections.  Bendjedid accommodated 
them and scheduled elections for the National Assembly to be 
held in June 1991. 
2. Electoral Reform 
The Algerian Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, and 
President Bendjedid set out to exploit the weakness of FIS 
due to their perceived waning popularity.  So, in the spring 
72Hugh Roberts, "A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism", Islamic 
Fundamentalisms  and  the Gulf Crisis,   James Piscatori, ed. (The 
Fundamentalism Project: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991) pp. 
144-8. 
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of 1991, an electoral law was passed by the National 
Assembly that was detrimental to FIS.  The new law increased 
the number of seats in the National Assembly and changed the 
distribution so that rural areas, where support for the FLN 
was greatest, were more heavily represented.  Also, a law 
was passed that forbade the use of mosques and schools for 
political purposes and restricted voting by proxy.73 
Although FIS had been weakened by the mismanagement of 
the wilayas and the support of Iraq during the Gulf War, it 
would not allow the new law to be passed without a fight. 
FIS leaders protested the electoral reform law and called 
for a general strike on 23 May 1991, just weeks before the 
elections were supposed to take place. Unfortunately for the 
Islamists, the strike was largely ineffectual because the 
bulk of FIS supporters were unemployed.  FIS then called or 
demonstrations and occupation of the main squares in 
Algiers, a much more effective tactic.  In response, 
Bendjedid canceled the elections and announced a state of 
emergency.  The army was again called in to restore order. 
Again, the army was brutal in its efforts; the Algerian 
League of Human Rights tallied 300 dead and 8000 arrested in 
clashes between Islamists and the army, but the government 
acknowledged only 55 deaths (5 of which were claimed to be 
soldiers) .74 For their part, the leaders of FIS told their 
73Under the previous voting law, men could vote by proxy in place of 
their wives and other members of their family, a practice that was used 
mostly by traditional Muslims and less by secular, Westernized 
Algerians. 
74Layachi and Haireche, p. 79. 
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followers to refrain from violence so the army would not 
have a reason to use excessive force.  However, the army 
provoked FIS members to violence when they began to remove 
Islamic slogans from town halls under FIS control and 
replace them with "By the People, For the People" which was 
the FLN's motto.  These provocation's began on 25 June and, 
after FIS members began to fight with the army, Madani and 
Belhadj were arrested on 30 June.  The charges brought 
against them included "armed conspiracy against the 
state."75 
Despite the violence and repression, the government 
acquiesced to Islamist demands and agreed to revise the 
electoral law.  The Prime Minister Hamrouche was replaced by 
Sid Ahmed Ghozali and Bendjedid agreed to reschedule the 
elections before the end of the year.  However, the revised 
electoral law still contained elements of the original only 
in a diluted form: it increased the seats in the National 
Assembly from 295 to 430 (instead of the 542 created in the 
earlier law) with most of the new seats representing rural 
areas where the FLN was strongly supported.  Since the FIS 
leadership and many of its followers were in jail, the party 
was unable to generate much resistance.  President Bendjedid 
rescheduled the parliamentary elections for 2 6 December 1991 
and 16 January 1992 in accordance with the two ballot 
system. 
75Roberts, pp. 148-9. 
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3. 1991 National Assembly Elections 
As the elections approached, FIS did not announce its 
decision to enter candidates until just twelve days prior to 
election day.  Despite the fact that its leaders were in 
prison and it did not have much campaign time, FIS had 
another astounding victory at the polls.  The legislative 
elections in December 1991 proved that the local elections 
the year before were not a fluke and that FIS retained its 
popularity.  EIS won 188 out of 430 seats in the first 
ballot.  The results were not quite as one-sided as those in 
the previous local elections but FIS needed to win just 28 
seats in the second ballot on 16 January to gain a majority 
and form a government. 
After the first round of elections, Bendjedid 
demonstrated his commitment to democratization by beginning 
negotiations with FIS.  The army and secular parties, 
already worried by the strong showing of FIS at the polls, 
became very concerned about the turn of events.  Bendjedid 
proposed a "cohabitation period" during which he would 
remain in the presidency and the Islamists would control 
non-strategic ministries such as education, justice and 
religious affairs.  The other ministries would be controlled 
by members of the FLN.  Alarmed at the prospect of an 
Islamist government, the army moved in, forced President 
Bendjedid to resign and established a High Security Council 
on 4 January 1992, just 12 days before the second round of 
elections were scheduled to be held.  Abdelmalek Benhabiles 
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was chosen to head the Council until a new president was 
elected, within 45 days per the Constitution.  However, 
Benhabiles resigned just days after being appointed and the 
army then formed a High State Council (HSC) consisting of 
civilian and military officials.  The HSC announced that 
elections would be rescheduled when the "necessary 
conditions are achieved for the normal functioning of 
institutions of the state." A resulting rise in violence 
caused the HSC to announce a state of emergency for one, year 
on 9 February and subsequently outlaw FIS on 4 March.76  In 
addition, Madani and Belhadj, imprisoned since the previous 
July, were tried in February and given sentences of 12 years 
each. 
D. DESCENT INTO CIVIL WAR 
With its leaders imprisoned and its political wing 
banned, FIS began an armed struggle against the state to 
reclaim what it considered to be its legitimate place in the 
Algerian government.  The Islamists resorted to guerrilla 
tactics including bombings, assassinations and pitched gun 
battles in the streets.77  The government responded by 
hunting down suspected extremists and fighting back in the 
streets.  The resulting civil war that has raged since 1992 
has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives, many of them innocent 
civilians. 
76Layachi   and Haireche,   pp.   80-1. 




The government's repression of FIS had several 
consequences, most detrimental to one side or the other. 
The head of the organization was effectively cut off when 
Madani and Belhadj were imprisoned and the internal 
organization of the group was weakened by its illegal 
status, however, the movement did not die.  Instead, the 
government's policies only increased the resolve of the FIS 
supporters and helped the movement gain popular support. 
The army was perceived by many as having taken illegal 
actions when they dissolved the government because the 
elections did not go their way.  The result was that many 
chose to support FIS, not because they favored an Islamic- 
based government, but because, in winning the'first round of 
elections, they gained legitimacy while the army, in taking 
over the government, had lost legitimacy. 
The Islamist organization was put into disarray by the 
government's repression but elements of the movement quickly 
reorganized to form the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).  The GIA 
began fighting a guerrilla war against the army but soon 
resorted to terrorism and attacks on innocent bystanders. 
The lack of competent leadership became apparent as 
intellectuals, journalists, foreigners, and even popular 
singers were all made targets for assassination by the GIA. 
Women who did not wear the traditional veil in public were 
murdered and raped. 
73 
Fearing a loss of support and marginalization due to 
the GIA's actions, FIS reorganized and, in the summer of 
1994, formed its official fighting arm, the Islamic 
Salvation Army (AIS). The AIS has fought a more conventional 
war against the Algerian army and is officially under the 
control of FIS, however, in the anarchic environment of 
civil war there have been incidents where the GIA and AIS 
have fought alongside each other and the distinction between 
the two has been blurred.  Certainly, the AIS has engaged, in 
some atrocities, but not to the extent of the GIA.78 For 
its part, the army has used napalm and summary executions in 
its fight against the Islamists. 
2. The Algerian Government 
The government remains controlled by the military. 
However, there is an internal ideological division between 
hard-liners, known as eradicators, and those in favor of 
dialogue with FIS, known as reconciliators.  The 
reconciliators seemed to have the upper hand when General 
Lamine Zeroual was installed as President in February 1994 
and made a move towards dialogue with FIS by moving Madani 
and Belhadj from prison to house arrest in September 1994. 
However, the negotiations between the government and the 
Islamists fell through and Zeroual announced on 31 October 
that dialogue had failed and the army was given full 
authority to wipe out the Islamist armed opposition.  Soon 
78Arun Kapil, "Algeria's Crisis Intensifies: The Search for a 'Civil 
Pact'", Middle East Report  January-February 1995, p. 5. 
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after the leader of the eradicators, General Mohammed 
Lamari, was promoted to General of the Army Corps, a new 
position created just for him. 
Part of the reason for the government's tough stance is 
the increased support it began to receive from France. 
Afraid of the massive immigration that a protracted civil 
war was producing, France increased its supply of high-tech 
arms to the Algerian army in hopes that it would quickly end 
the war. 
On 17 November 1995, the government made a move to 
consolidate its legitimacy by holding presidential 
elections, the first elections since 1991.  Zeroual won 
convincingly with over 60 percent of the votes.  However, 
FIS is still outlawed and was not allowed to participate in 
the elections which caused many Islamists to declare that 
the government still lacked legitimacy. 
3. Efforts to End the Civil War 
Efforts have been made to end the civil war on several 
occasions.  Unfortunately, none of them has paid dividends 
so far.  As mentioned above, President Zeroual tried to 
negotiate with FIS in late 1994 but to no avail.  In January 
1995,Sant Egidio, a Catholic association with close ties to 
the Vatican, invited leaders from the disputing sides 
(including the major secular parties in Algeria) to Rome for 
a conference.  Representatives from both FIS and the FLN 
attended.  The conference produced a National Contract in 
which all groups agreed to: reject violence as a means of 
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gaining or retaining power, respect legitimate changeover of 
power, reject dictatorship, enforce the army's non- 
intervention in political affairs, and respect and promote 
human rights.79 Unfortunately, the agreement did not go 
much further.  The reaction by President Zeroual was a 
denunciation of the conference and its outcome as uninvited 
intervention in Algeria's domestic affairs.  Finally, as 
stated above, presidential elections were held in November 
1995.  Although the FIS was banned from participating, an 
Islamist candidate, Sheik Mahfoud Nahnah, the leader of the 
Algerian Islamist group Hamas, came in a distant second 
behind Zeroual.  The fact that an Islamist candidate entered 
the race and lost added some legitimacy to Zeroual's 
presidency although most members of FIS do not hold that 
opinion and it is unlikely that the election will end the 
civil war. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The civil war in Algeria is not as much a product of 
ideology as it is of legitimacy.  The rise of the Islamist 
movement was brought about by economic hardship and thrived 
due to the lack of legitimacy of the FLN regime.  FIS 
assumed the leadership of a popular anti-government 
sentiment and gained support through populist rhetoric.  The 
civil war was the result of the regime's vacillation in its 
79William H. Lewis, "Algeria on the Brink", Strategic Forum   (National 
Defense  University Institute for National  Strategic Studies)   no. 32 
(June 1995) p. 2-3. 
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policies towards the Islamists: political liberalization 
followed by brutal repression.  The army proved that it was 
unwilling to commit to democracy if it meant that an 
Islamist government would be in power.  However, once the 
door to democratization was opened, it has been difficult to 
close it again. 
The Islamists demonstrated a willingness and ability to 
work through a democratic process.  They ran campaigns, 
gathered support and were legally elected to office.  Their 
lack of management skills at the local levels of government 
brings up questions of their ability to govern at the 
national level, however, they never got the chance to prove 
themselves. 
The Algerian Civil War has not ended and it is 
difficult to predict how it may end.  However, it provides 
an excellent picture of what may happen in Egypt if they 
vacillate in their policies towards the Islamists in the 
same manner as the Algerian government.  Although the army 
has the power to install the government it wants, without 
support from the people, civil war may be the best that will 
come out of the situation. 
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V. EGYPT: CRADLE OF ISLAMISM 
A. THREAT TO EGYPTIAN STABILITY 
In this century, Islamism in the Middle East had its 
beginnings in Egypt with the formation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1928.  The rise and spread of the movement 
within Egypt and to other Middle Eastern states has been a 
cause for concern by leaders throughout the region as well 
as in the West.  Egypt's longstanding position as leader of 
the Arab world combined with its close ties to the West make 
its political stability a concern to the national interests 
of states in both camps.  Therefore, the violent Islamist 
political opposition that has grown in Egypt has become a 
threat, not only to Egypt's political stability, but also to 
the national interests of countries in the Middle East and 
in the West, including the United States.  So far, the • 
Egyptian government's attempts to neutralize the Islamists 
have failed to do so.  Egyptian policies since the takeover 
by the Free Officers in 1952 have ranged from repression to 
co-optation with varying results, but, over the last four 
and a half decades, the Islamist opposition has become 
increasingly violent.  Today, the Egyptian government is in 
a position where it must find a solution to its Islamist 
problem or its political system may collapse. 
In Egypt, the phenomenon known as Islamism or Islamic 
extremism can be explained as a reaction by the middle and 
lower middle classes to poor economic and social conditions. 
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The frustration and disillusionment resulting from these 
conditions is a breeding ground for anger with government 
and many Egyptians have adopted Islamism as an ideology 
which they believe can provide solutions to societal 
problems.  However, Egyptian Islamism is not a monolithic 
organization.  Not only do the various Islamist groups 
differ from each other but Egyptian Islamism has evolved 
through the four and a half decades since the revolution in 
1952; Islamists today are different in many ways from those 
of the 1950s, 60's, 70 's and 80's.  While the economic and 
social problems in Egypt are both a result of poor 
government as well as a cause of the formation of Islamic 
extremist groups, there are other factors that have played a 
role in the evolution of Islamism.  A major ingredient to 
the development of these organizations has been the various 
attempts by the government to control or eliminate the 
groups. These policies have had a great effect on the 
evolution and growth of the Islamic political opposition. 
The specific ideologies of the various Islamist factions in 
many ways are direct and indirect results of actions and 
policies taken by the Egyptian governments under Gamel Abdel 
Nasser, Anwar Sadat or Hosni Mubarak. 
The policies of each of the three presidents since the 
revolution have been very different but, at the same time, 
have used similar tactics.  The policies can be generally 
classified into two broad categories: repression and co- 
optation.  All three presidents used these two policies in 
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different ways, in varying degrees and, ultimately, with 
different results.  None of the three post-1952 rulers have 
hesitated to use violence and force to repress Islamist 
dissidents.  Cases of imprisonment without trial or trial by 
military court as well as torture and execution have been 
reported under each regime.  Co-optation has also been a 
tool used to control Islamists, particularly by Sadat in the 
early 1970s but also by Nasser and Mubarak to lesser 
extents.  With this policy the government attempted to 
deflect opposition and control the Islamists by assimilating 
them into the political structure. 
The effects of these policies on the formation and 
nature of Islamist organizations were varied and manifold. 
To understand the present political climate in Egypt with 
regards to Islamists, one must first understand the 
evolution of Islamic extremism, i.e. the differences among 
the Islamists over time as well as  their differing 
ideologies.  Then it is necessary to look at the 
governmental responses to such groups by each of the three 
regimes since the revolution in 1952.  The effects of these 
policies, both intentional and unintentional, have shaped 
not only the nature of the political discourse but also the 
nature of the various groups.  Sometimes the governmental 
responses effectively silenced the Islamists or channeled 
their energies in positive ways.  In other cases the 
policies that were designed to eliminate Islamist groups or, 
at the very least, control them, actually backfired and 
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produced a growth of Islamism.   In any event, despite the 
government's experience with Islamic extremists for over 40 
years, it has not yet found the answer to political 
opposition in the form of Islamic fundamentalism.  Possibly 
the answer lies in the analysis of governmental policies and 
the effects they have had on the Islamist movement. 
B. CHANGING NATURE OF EGYPTIAN ISLAMISM 
1. Similarities Between Islamists Over Time 
Before analyzing how Islamic extremists are different 
from each other, one must first understand how they are 
similar.  Although Islamism is not a monolithic movement and 
the beliefs of even a single organization can change over 
time, there are some elements that are common to all 
organizations of the Islamist movement.  One of these 
elements is the fundamental reason for formation and 
involvement.  The root of each Islamist group, past and 
present, is discontent with the economic and social 
situation within Egypt.  This discontent manifests itself in 
a search for an ideology which offers a solution to social 
and economic problems.80  It is not surprising that the 
ideology that many Egyptians embrace is Islamism.  Although 
°"This interpretation is the most dominant in the literature surveyed. 
Examples can be found in: Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Resurgence of 
Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation", Islam  and Power, 
Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal, eds., (Washington: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1981) p. 115; Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in 
Egypt", Middle East  Journal  vol. 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995) pp. 9-13; 
Stanley Reed, "The Battle for Egypt", Foreign Äffairs  72, no. 4 
(September-October 1993), p. 97. 
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Egypt does contain a significant minority of Coptic 
Christians, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians are 
Muslims and it is almost second nature for discontented 
Muslims to turn to Islam for cures to societal ills. 
The other element shared by all Islamist groups, past 
and present, is the basic ideology that they are certain 
contains the key to a perfect society.  This ideology, at 
its most basic level, dictates that society should be 
organized and governed in accordance with the teachings of 
the Qu'ran and that the shariah should be the law of the 
land. 
2. Differences Among Islamists Over Time 
Unfortunately for Islamists, that is usually where the 
agreement ends.  Different interpretations of what exactly 
such a government would look like or what school of 
jurisprudence to accept are only the beginning of the 
differences between the groups.  One major difference is the 
methods which each group chooses to use to achieve their 
goal.  These methods can be divided into two broad 
categories: working with the government via political and 
social activism or fighting against any government which 
does not accept the Islamist ideal, using all means 
necessary including violence. 
The first major Islamist organization, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, is a good example of one that is willing to 
work with the government and accepted political channels to 
achieve the type of society they want.  It is also a good 
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example of an organization that has gone through ideological 
change during the course of its existence.  The leader of 
the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time of the 
revolution in 1952 was Hassan al-Hudaybi.  Hudaybi had 
succeeded the founder of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, 
as General Guide, as the leader of the Brotherhood is 
called, in 1951.  He had been a judge for 25 years and 
brought an air of respectability to the organization which 
was sorely needed after four years of violent opposition to 
the government.  One of his first acts as General Guide was 
to renounce the violence during the years 1946-49 and the 
secret group within the Brotherhood that had committed them. 
After the revolution the Brotherhood enjoyed a short 
honeymoon with the new regime, however, soon conflict 
emerged on several issues.  Although Hudaybi wanted to work 
out the differences peacefully through normal political 
channels, he did not enjoy the same loyalty of his followers 
as al-Banna.  In 1954 an assassination attempt on Nasser was 
blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood which resulted in Hudaybi's 
imprisonment along with hundreds of others.  Hudaybi's well 
known antipathy for violence strongly suggests that the 
assassination attempt was carried out without his knowledge 
or approval.81 
Hudaybi's successor as the leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was Umar al-Talmasani.  He was also an advocate 
81Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers,   (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969) p. 149. 
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of initiating change through legal political discourse.  His 
main vehicle for bringing about this change was the 
Brotherhood's newspaper al-Dawa  which he edited. al-Dawa 
provided political commentary and espoused the views of the 
Muslim Brethren, however, it still remained well within the 
bounds of civil opposition.  The Brotherhood assumed the 
role of a "moderate" Islamist movement due to the fact that 
it called for change through the workings of government not 
violence as well as the fact that other, more radical 
organizations such as Gama'at Islamiyya had become very 
violent by comparison. 
A noticeable shift in Islamist rhetoric occurred in the 
mid-1960s.  The ideology began to call for the overthrow of 
any government, including Arab governments, which did not 
adhere to the letter of the Qu'ran and adopt the shariah. 
This shift came initially from the writings of Sayyid Qutb, 
specifically from his book, Milestones.   The premise of 
Qutb's writings was that modern society was in a state of 
jahilliyya or ignorance that rivaled the society that 
existed prior to the Prophet's reception of the Message from 
God.  True Islamic society "is now buried under the debris 
of man-made traditions of several generations and is crushed 
under the weight of those false laws and customs that are 
not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings."82 
According to Qutb, the only way to return to Islam and 
82Sayyid Qutb, Milestones,   (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 
1993) p. 7. 
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overcome the present bout of jahilliyya was to form a 
vanguard which would lead the umma or Islamic community in 
holy struggle to overthrow the offending government.  Qutb 
was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and wrote Milestones 
while in prison following Nasser's clamp down on that 
organization.  The thinly veiled reference to Nasser's own 
regime as that of jahilliyya ensured that the book was 
banned and that Qutb was executed.  The damage to the regime 
had been done, however, and in his writings Qutb survived to 
inspire future generations of Islamists. 
Although the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood 
condemned Qutb's views after his death in 1966, Milestones 
had a huge impact on other Islamists.  The Brotherhood was 
soon divided into the two camps: those who chose to bring 
about change through social activism and preaching and those 
who worked for the violent overthrow of the government.  The 
older, more "moderate" leadership won the debate and the 
Muslim Brotherhood continued to work within the political 
system to achieve its goals.  As a result, numerous other 
Islamist groups were formed that were much more militant 
than the old guard in the Muslim Brotherhood. 
One of these groups was formed by a former member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Shukri Mustafa.  Mustafa had served 
six years in prison for his activities as a member of the 
Brotherhood where he was highly influenced by Qutb.  When he 
was released he formed the Society of Muslims, more commonly 
known as Takfir w'al Hijrah or Excommunication and Holy 
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Flight.  Mustafa's ideology grew from the belief that his 
group was the vanguard of which Qutb wrote.  To keep the 
vanguard pure he removed them from society as best he could 
until a time when they would have sufficient strength to 
lead the overthrow of the infidel government and usher in 
the new wave of Islam.  Although the group was generally 
nonviolent towards the Egyptian population, they did use 
violence against their own members who decided they wanted 
out of the organization. Mustafa and other members of this 
group were executed in 1977 after they took the former 
minister for Religious Endowments hostage and assassinated 
him.83 
Another group which embraced the teachings of Sayyid 
Qutb was al-Jihad, whose chief ideologue was Abd al-Salam 
Faraj.  Faraj wrote his own tract called The Hidden 
Imperative  which expanded on Qutb's Milestones  but was much 
more dogmatic and violent.  Faraj's group took action on 
their beliefs and assassinated President Sadat in 1981. 
Through the years since the revolution the ideologies 
of Islamists have not been the only things about them to 
change.  Differences among Islamists have also developed 
over the years with regard to social profile.  The types of 
people that become rank and file Islamists in present-day 
Egypt are different from their ideological forefathers 
during the reigns of Nasser and Sadat.  Although there was 
83John L. Esposito, The  Islamic  Threat:  Myth  or Reality?,   (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992)pp. 133-138. 
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only slight variance in social profile of Islamists for the 
first three decades after the revolution, the Islamist of 
today differs from that of 1952 as well as that of every 
decade in between in matters of social class, education and 
age.  In the 1950s the members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
were generally educated, middle and lower middle class, and 
employed as civil servants, teachers, white collar workers, 
small merchants, businessmen and craftsmen.84  By the time 
of the crackdown by Nasser in 1965 the leadership was 
middle-aged or elderly but new, younger members were 
recruited from among the same social class.   Of the members 
of Takfir w'al Hijrah that were imprisoned in 1977, the 
majority were unemployed due to the seclusion that they were 
forced to accept as a requirement for membership in the 
group.  However, they were also well educated, the majority 
being university graduates or students at the time of their 
arrest. The average age was 24 which meant Mustafa was 16 
years older than the average.85  By the time of Sadat's 
assassination in 1981 the average age of the leadership of 
al-Jihad was 28 years old while only one member was 50. Most 
came from lower middle class backgrounds and were well 
educated.86 However, recent arrests of Islamists show a 
dramatic turn in the trend.  While the statistics show 
84Nazih Ayubi, Political  Islam:  Religion  and Politics in   the Arab 
World,(New York: Routledge, 1991) p. 81. 
85Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: 
Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings", International  Journal  of 
Middle East  Studies  12 (1980) pp. 438-9. 
86Ayubi, p. 82. 
little change in average age among Islamists in the four 
preceding decades (mid-2Os), the average age plunged to 21 
by 1990.  Additionally, today's Islamists are far less 
educated than those of the previous four decades. Only 
twenty percent of those arrested in the 1990's have been 
university graduates or students and the percentage of 
Islamists educated in the most difficult disciplines such as 
engineering and medicine has dropped from 50 to 11 since the 
1970s.  Also, the Islamists today are coming from the lower 
classes as opposed to the middle classes in previous 
years.87  Therefore, the trend shows that the average 
Islamist has become younger, poorer and less educated 
through the years. 
C. ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICY SINCE 1952 
The role that the government has played in the 
development and evolution of Islamism in Egypt can be traced 
out by looking at the policies of the last three presidents. 
While each president's policies have been different from the 
other, all have used the same tactics to control or 
eliminate Islamists, namely repression and co-optation. 
Repression refers to heavy handed policies that include 
arrest, long term imprisonment, torture, execution and, more 
recently, house demolition.  Co-optation means any number of 
tactics intended to assimilate Islamist groups or at least 
87Cassandra, p. 20. 
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to engage in constructive political dialogue in order to 
preempt their use of violence. 
1. Nasser's Regime 
The Muslim Brotherhood supported the Free Officers and 
the revolution in 1952.  The general feeling of 
dissatisfaction in the army with the government was well 
known and members of the Free Officers were urged by Muslim 
Brothers to take action to save the country from ruin.  In 
fact, many of the Muslim Brethren including the father of 
its founder, Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, felt that the 
Brotherhood had been the inspiration behind the revolution. 
Richard Mitchell, author of the definitive work on the early 
Muslim Brotherhood, wrote that al-Banna thought the 
organization was, 
"the 'consciousness' which created the very idea 
of rebellion against the oppressions of Egypt; the 
revolution was the 'echo1 and the 'offspring' of 
the Society of the Muslim Brothers.  The view was 
given prominence in books written after the 
revolution by members of the Society in which the 
writers saluted 'the blessed movement' and its 
authors as the fulfillment of their long-awaited 
goals and the fruit of their long and painful 
endeavor."88 
The Free Officers took advantage of the support from 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The first year of the new regime was 
marked by cooperation between it and the Brotherhood.  The 
88Mitchell, pp. 105-6. 
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government immediately released political prisoners, many of 
whom were Brothers and abolished the secret police, 
arresting many that had persecuted members of the 
Brotherhood.  The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) even 
invited three members of the Brotherhood to join the new 
cabinet.  However, the Brotherhood's Guidance Council 
declined the invitation.  Although the Guidance Council's 
decision was not meant to put itself at odds with the 
regime, that is exactly what it did.  Friction continued to 
build between the regime and the Brotherhood, while at the 
same time internal division arose within the regime between 
President Mohammed Neguib and Prime Minister Nasser. 
Although Neguib held the office of president, Nasser was 
really in charge.  Demanding power commensurate with his 
position but not receiving a satisfactory answer from the 
RCC, Neguib resigned.  When his resignation was announced a 
widespread and spontaneous uprising convinced him to return 
to office.  Crowds formed to demonstrate support for him 
which included several anti-Nasser Muslim Brethren.  As a 
result, many of the leaders of the Brotherhood were arrested 
that very night.  Later, they were released and agreed to 
cooperate with the government. 
The leader of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi, hated 
violence and honestly sought peace with the government.  His 
goal was to come to terms with Nasser and the RCC so that 
real change and good could result from the revolution. 
However, the regime and Hudaybi found themselves on opposite 
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sides of many issues and, finally, the government waged a 
media campaign to discredit Hudaybi and the rest of the 
Muslim Brethren.  The conflict reached a climax when eight 
shots were fired at Nasser during a speech on 27 October 
1954. After hundreds of suspected Muslim Brethren were 
arrested including the leadership, their trial began before 
a military tribunal.  The trial lasted from November 1954 to 
February 1955 and, all in all, about 1000 members were 
tried. The evidence against the Muslim Brothers was flimsy 
and was used to support all sorts of charges such as 
immorality, homosexuality, adultery, embezzlement and 
molestation of women as well as plotting to overthrow the 
government. The trial was not what would be called 'due 
process' in the West.  As described by Mitchell, 
"From the beginning it was clear that the last 
thing the government intended was to clarify the 
case and assess individual guilt...The chief 
'judge' - Gamal Salim - conducted himself rather 
as chief prosecutor: he freely interrupted the 
answers of the witnesses if the answer displeased 
him; he put words into their mouths and forced - 
sometimes by threats - the desired 
answers...Sometimes he engaged in petty insults 
with the witnesses; in most cases the insults came 
from the court alone.  The court freely set one 
witness against the other, fabricating the 
testimony of one to incite another.  The audience 
was allowed, even encouraged, to participate in 
laughter and ridicule and to jeer at and insult 
the witnesses."89 
Torture was used in the prisons to force 'confessions' 
out of the members as well as turn them against each other. 
69Ibid,  p. 155. 
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By the end of the trial, about half were acquitted or 
received suspended sentences, six were executed and the rest 
were given lengthy prison sentences including life 
imprisonment for Hudaybi.  Included in the numbers of 
prisoners was Sayyid Qutb who was profoundly influenced by 
the maltreatment of his comrades and himself at the hands of 
the government.  It was during this time that soldiers "put 
down a rebellion" within the prison camp by massacring 21 
prisoners who had locked themselves in their cells, fearing 
for their lives.90 
The Muslim Brotherhood remained alive outside the 
prison camps in meetings of small groups of sympathizers and 
by the time that Qutb was released in 1964 the group had 
been reorganized.  Upon his release Qutb's book, 
Milestones,was printed and embraced by Islamists as their 
manifesto.  The government, however, viewed the book as 
evidence of a conspiracy to overthrow the regime.  In July 
1965 the government arrested Qutb and other Muslim Brethren 
including one who 'confessed' to the plot which gave 
military security reason enough to arrest the rest of the 
organization.  Another military court was convened and, 
based on confessions exacted through torture, Qutb and 
several compatriots were found guilty and hanged in August 
1966.91 
90Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt:   The Prophet  and the Pharaoh, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) p. 28. 
91Ibid,  pp. 31-36. 
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The effects of Nasser's policies, particularly the 
repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, set the stage for the 
problems of his successors with other, more violent, 
Islamist groups.  The incarceration, torture and harassment 
of the Muslim Brothers may have effectively silenced the 
entire movement if Sayyid Qutb had not been among the 
prisoners.  His writings and martyrdom proved to be the 
inspiration for several other organizations that formed in 
the 1970s and 1980s including Takfir w'al Hijrah and al- 
Jihad. Milestones  marked the transition into the new era of 
Islamic militantism that sought to bring about change by 
violent means.  The repressive means that Nasser used also 
effectively tamed the Muslim Brotherhood; they came into the 
bounds of vocal but lawful opposition and have not strayed 
out of those bounds since.  This also served to fuel the 
ideology of the more violent Islamist movement:the younger 
generation viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as having sold out 
to the government and given up on their cause.  The result 
was the funneling of new, younger discontents into other, 
more violent and dogmatic groups. 
2. Sadat's Regime 
When Anwar Sadat came to power after the death of 
Nasser in 1970 he had the unfortunate job of succeeding the 
most popular Arab leader in modern times.  Sadat did not 
have the same charisma and did not enjoy the same following 
as Nasser which became apparent from the vocal opposition of 
Nasserist and leftist groups.  One of President Nasser's 
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policies which came back to haunt his successor was the 
granting of free university education to all qualifying 
Egyptians.  Many seized the opportunity and quickly the 
universities filled beyond capacity as enrollment doubled 
during the 1960s92 and more than doubled again in the 1970s. 
The intention of the education program was to produce native 
engineers, doctors and other professionals which would help 
strengthen the economy.  This plan backfired, however, as 
the universities became a breeding ground for political 
opposition groups. 
Sadat's answer to the problem was a policy of co- 
optation of the Islamists to counter the opposition from the 
left.  This policy marked the rejuvenation of the Islamist 
movement.  The support given to Islamists by "the Believer 
President" as Sadat insisted on being called, encouraged the 
growth of these organizations, particularly among students 
at the universities.  The new president allowed Islamic 
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Sufi orders to 
function publicly without fear of being suppressed as they 
had been under Nasser.  He built mosques and increased the 
amount of Islamic programming on television and radio 
stations. Probably most importantly, he provided funds to 
Islamist student organizations at the universities.93 
Sadat's efforts were helped by the residual humiliation felt 
by Egyptians from their defeat at the hands of the Israelis 
92Anthony McDermott, Egypt  from Nasser to Mubarak:' A Flawed 
Revolution,(New York: Croom Helm, 1988) p. 206. 
93Esposito, p. 94. 
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in the Six Day War in 1967.  The policy was a success and 
the number of Islamists grew until they took over the 
student unions and effectively took charge of the 
universities.94 
It was this time that could arguably be called the 
Islamists' finest hour.  The strength of Sadat's co-optation 
of the Islamist students was the fact that the universities 
had become filled with political groups that were a vocal 
opposition to Sadat's presidency.  By supporting the 
Islamist students' organizations financially and 
politically, Sadat helped them grow in size and strength 
until they dominated the campuses.  These organizations 
refrained from public criticism of Sadat's regime and 
focused most of their efforts on rectifying the problems 
that had developed in the university system from 
overcrowding and underfunding.  Student to teacher ratios 
were outrageous and expensive tutoring and texts were 
necessities for obtaining a degree.  The terrible conditions 
of the university system were attacked by the Islamists with 
programs designed to benefit the students as well as to 
promote Islam.  Women were segregated from men in classrooms 
and provided all-female buses so they could avoid many of 
the indignities that came with close contact with men in 
crowded environments.  Notes and textbooks were provided at 
little or no charge on a mass scale and group study sessions 
94Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser, The  Islamic Movement in Egypt:   Perceptions 
of International Relations  1961-81,    (London: Kegan Paul International, 
Ltd., 1994) pp. 59-60. 
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were organized at local mosques so that students could study- 
together without distractions.95 
Once the opposition to Sadat from the left had been 
neutralized, his enthusiasm for the Islamists waned. 
However, by 197 6-77 Islamism had become a large and powerful 
movement, gaining a life of its own, independent of 
government support.  The cozy relationship between Sadat's 
government and the Islamists began to erode as the goals of 
each began to diverge.  It became more and more apparent to 
the Islamists that much of Sadat's Islamic rhetoric and 
support was politically motivated; he had only been 
supportive of them to counter his enemies on the left. 
Islamist support for Sadat began to recede and they became 
more openly critical of his presidency.  The popularity of 
Islamist organizations was increased by the disillusionment 
among the population with the implementation of Sadat's 
economic liberalization policy known as intifah which opened 
the door for widespread corruption in the government and 
helped the wealthy at the expense of the lower classes. 
Islamists perceived Sadat's policies as moves towards 
"Westernization" and away from Islam.  Other indications of 
Sadat's true secular nature were found in speeches made by 
his wife, Jihan.  She promoted women's rights and was a 
driving force in persuading President Sadat to enact laws 
that restricted the ability of Muslim men to marry more than 
one wife.  Finally, Sadat's peace negotiations with the 
95Kepel, 136-145. 
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Israelis, while popular among the general Egyptian 
population, were heavily criticized by Islamists. 
As Sadat removed his support for the Islamist groups, 
it became evident they had become too strong.  It was soon 
apparent that the Islamists had gathered enough support and 
become sufficiently organized to be independent.  The 
government soon found itself on a collision course with the 
Islamic opposition.  In July 1977, the government's 
relationship with the Islamists became openly violent when 
Takfir w'al Hijrah took hostage the former minister for 
Religious Endowments and assassinated him. 
The group headed by Shukri Mustafa was not a 
particularly violent one.  It did use force against any 
member which left the group, but that can be considered an 
internal matter.  Generally, the group wanted to remove 
itself from society and form a vanguard that would usher in 
the new Islamic society when it became strong enough.  In 
the meantime, the goal of the organization was to remain 
pure and loyal to its beliefs by avoiding contact with the 
world of jahilliyya.  Some of the members of Takfir w'al 
Hijrah were arrested during a disciplinary visit to a lapsed 
member.  They were detained without trial and the other 
members of the group demanded their release.  When the 
government did not release the prisoners, the minister was 
kidnapped and a deadline was set for the release of their 
comrades in exchange for the minister.  The government did 
not give in to the demand, so the minister was 
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assassinated.96 The trial, imprisonment and execution of 
Mustafa and his followers was the beginning of a policy of 
repression by Sadat. 
When Sadat stopped supporting the Islamists, they 
turned against him en masse.  It was not a difficult turn to 
make since Sadat made himself a target for Islamist 
opposition.  His wife was an outspoken feminist, his 
government was corrupt and he was consorting with the enemy 
through peace negotiations with the Israelis, according to 
the Islamist view.97 An electrician named Mohammed Abd al- 
Salam Faraj became a leader of the Islamist opposition. 
Faraj's ideology was an extension of Qutb's which he wrote 
down in his short book, The Hidden  Imperative.     Faraj took 
the idea of jihad or holy struggle to its extreme, that all 
jahilliyya governments must fall, 
"The first battlefield for jihad is the uprooting 
of these infidel leaders and replacing them with 
an Islamic system from which we can build...Now, 
in Islamic countries, the enemy lives in our 
midst.  The enemy is even in control; in fact, the 
enemy is those rulers who took over Islamic 
leadership, thus fighting them is an absolute 
duty."98 
In the spring of 1980 confessional conflict broke out 
between Coptic Christians and Islamists in the town of Minya 
which required intervention by the central government.  In 
96Ibid,   pp. 95-97. 
^'Esposito, p. 95. 
^Abd al-Salam Faraj, The Hidden  Imperative,   quoted in its entirety in 
Appendix I of Revolt Against Modernity:Muslim Zealots  and  the West  by 
Michael Youssef (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985) pp. 161, 165. 
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mid-1981, fighting erupted in a Cairo neighborhood between 
Muslims and Copts which the government, again, had to stop. 
As a preemptive move against further strife, over 1500 
people, many of which were Islamists and secular opposition, 
were arrested in September.  One of those imprisoned was the 
leader of the Islamist faction at the Asyut faculty of 
commerce, Mohammed al-Islambuli.  Mohammed's brother, 
Khalid, was a member of Faraj's group and an army 
lieutenant.  When he heard of his brother's incarceration, 
he went to Faraj with a plan to kill Sadat.  On 6 October 
1981, during a ceremony commemorating the 1973 War, 
Islambuli carried out his plan and assassinated "the 
Believer President."99 
It can be argued that Anwar Sadat was a victim of his 
own policies.  His initial co-optation of the Islamists 
allowed them to arise from the ashes (after Nasser's 
repressive policies all but eliminated them) and become more 
powerful than ever before.  Although the Islamists had been 
co-opted by the government, they had not forsaken their 
ideals.  Once it became evident that the government would 
not cater to them, a mutual divergence of goals occurred and 
the Islamists became one of Sadat's loudest critics. 
Unfortunately for Sadat, they had become too powerful for 
him to control and he resorted to repressive tactics which 
had the effect of throwing gasoline on a fire. 
99Kepel, pp. 210-211. 
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3. Mubarak's Regime 
Sadat's vice president, Hosni Mubarak, succeeded him 
in the presidency and immediately clamped down on the 
Islamist opposition.  Arrests were made and trials were held 
to punish those responsible for Sadat's death.  Faraj, 
Islambuli and others were executed and many more were 
imprisoned.  As events settled down, however, Mubarak 
relaxed many of the repressive policies of the prior 
administration.  The opposition press was tolerated and 
began to expand, freer elections were held which included 
the candidacy of several members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
for the first time since 194 4 (under the banner of the Wafd 
Party) and Mubarak included opposition leaders in 
consultations on decisions.  The result of these policies 
was an initial acceptance of Mubarak by both the secular and 
the religious opposition.100 
From that time on, however, Mubarak's presidency went 
downhill.  Nine members of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
elected to the People's Assembly.  They began to put 
pressure on the government to institute the shariah as 
Egyptian law but the parliament refused.  The issue became 
one of hot debate and soon divided the nation.  Islamists 
who had been quiescent while President Mubarak was still new 
in office and had an image of being "moderate" and pragmatic 
became more active.  Students began to hold demonstrations 
which brought about government reaction by closing the 
100Ibid,  pp. 243-245. 
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universities.  The next step was riots which were forcibly 
put down by government security forces.101 
Economic and social conditions in Egypt have continued 
to worsen since Mubarak came to power and, as a result, the 
opposition has become more vocal.  By the early 1990's 
militant Islamists had again begun to commit violent acts in 
the attempt to bring down the government.  The response by 
Mubarak has been a policy of repression that, in many ways, 
is more harsh than either of his predecessors'.  Not only 
are Islamists being arrested, imprisoned and executed but 
Mubarak has borrowed a tactic from the Israelis and has 
started to demolish the houses of Islamists' relatives.102 
He has started to seize control of the mosques.  Sermon 
subjects even in private mosques must be approved by the 
government in advance.  Women and children are taken into 
custody to persuade Islamists to turn themselves in to the 
police.103 Most importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
as publicly professed the desire change the government 
peacefully, through the political process,has been 
persecuted together with more radical and violent 
organizations.  The Brotherhood had been making a comeback 
by winning elections in trade unions and putting up 
candidates for national legislative elections by running 
them in other parties.  However, as recently as November 
101Robert Springborg, Mubarak's  Egypt,    (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) 
pp. 216-7. 
102"Turn Back, Mubarak", The Economist  4 February 1995, p. 15. 
103
"The Insurgency That Will Not Stop", The Economist  15 May 1993, p. 
44. 
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1995, the government has arrested many of the candidates and 
their supporters, charging them with anti-government 
activities.104 By doing so, the government makes no 
differentiation between moderates and extremists. 
The effects of Mubarak's policies towards Islamic 
extremists are not yet as clear as those of Nasser and 
Sadat.  He has resorted to a strictly repressive policy a  la 
Nasser, but times have changed and Islamism is bigger and 
stronger than in the 1950s and 1960s.  He somewhat resembles 
the sorcerer's apprentice in Fantasia,   every time he attacks 
an Islamist group two more seem to appear in its place. 
Mubarak's legitimacy is seriously being questioned by 
Egyptians, both secular and religious, and many believe that 
he will be deposed when the army decides that he is no 
longer fit to rule. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The political climate in Egypt today is partially the 
result of the policies of the government towards the 
Islamist movement since the revolution in 1952.  These 
organizations chose Islam to be their ideology to improve 
the conditions of their society.  Although the nature of the 
groups has evolved so that the Islamists of today only 
faintly resemble their ideological forefathers, the 
conditions that produced Islamism remain.  Certainly, the 
104Mona Eltahawy, "Egyptian Government Cracks Down on Fundamentalists", 
.Reuter News Agengy  27 November 1995. 
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inability of the regime to deal with certain economic and 
social conditions are to blame more than its inability to 
deal with Islamic extremists.  In fact, Egyptian 
governmental response to Islamism may be described as a 
classic case of treating the symptom instead of the disease, 
The similarities between the eras in which Islamism had its 
largest increases in membership give a glimpse of the 
factors which lead to Egyptian Islamism, 
"In Egypt in the 1930"s there was the Great 
Depression and its aftermath, combined with the 
feeling that earlier national struggle for 
independence had come to a halt before signing of 
the 1936 treaty with Great Britain, a treaty that 
fell short of national expectations.  The events 
of the 1940 's - the war, the increasing influx of 
foreign troops, the soaring migration from rural 
areas to serve the war efforts of the Allies, the 
rising inflation, the immediate postwar 
unemployment - all contributed to widespread 
social discontent.  That was the decade during 
which the Brotherhood enjoyed its greatest 
expansion and organizational strength.  The middle 
and lower middle classes were most adversely 
affected by the socioeconomic and political 
developments of the 1930's and 1940's.  And sure 
enough, they were most responsive to the call of 
the Muslim Brotherhood... 
During the late 1960s and the 197 0s there was 
a national defeat (1967), followed by an 
increasing foreign presence (Russians, then 
Americans), hardening of the social and political 
arteries of the country (as upward mobility and 
political participation significantly diminished) , 
soaring inflation and dim future prospects for the 
youngest and brightest members of the middle and 
lower middle classes."105 
This same situation can be seen in Egypt today and is 
arguably worse than in the previous decades.  Unemployment 
105Ibrahim, p. 446-7. 
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is rising, food and clothing prices are going up due to the 
slashing of subsidies, and per capita income is dropping. 
The once healthy industry of tourism has been severely hurt 
by Islamist attacks on foreigners.  The government appears 
to be failing and the people are turning to Islam as the 
solution. 
If the reasons for the embrace of Islamism have 
remained the same and, therefore, can be treated as a 
constant, then there must be a different reason, a variable, 
for its growth since the 1950s.  That variable can be found 
in the effects that the various governmental responses have 
had on the Islamist movement.  The government's role in the 
creation  of Islamism is poor economic and social policies 
which create discontent.  The government's role in the 
spread  of Islamism is the varied and inconsistent policies 
of repression and co-optation by Egypt's last three 
presidents. 
Although the three presidents have used similar tactics 
in dealing with Islamists, the results have been very 
different.  If members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
1950s had the same concerns that members of Gama'at 
Islamiyya do today, why are not the repressive policies of 
Mubarak as effective as those of Nasser?  The answer is 
found in the differences in time and setting.  Mubarak's 
Islamist problem is much larger and more violent than 
Nasser's.  Islamists during the majority of Nasser's rule 
did not have a coherent ideology in written form as did 
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later Islamists in the texts of Sayyid Qutb.  Also, today's 
Islamists are much more willing to use violence to achieve 
their goals. 
The Mubarak regime's use of violence to eliminate the 
Islamist opposition continues to be poorly planned.  By 
cracking down on the nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood, which 
has a substantial following and tacit support, the 
government is preventing the Islamist element in Egyptian 
society to have no voice in government.  This policy can 
only result in more discontent. Therefore, by continuing the 
current policy of repression, Mubarak may make himself too 
unpopular, resulting in a change in government, either 
through a popular revolution or, more likely, a military 




Several conclusions can be drawn from the comparisons 
made between the Islamist situation in Egypt and that in 
Syria, Jordan and Algeria.  Each country provides its own 
lessons which can be carefully applied to Egypt, but there 
are also a couple of patterns which indicate possible 
paradigms with regard to Arab governments and Islamist 
movements in the Middle East.  The Syrian model is one which 
has the most limited value in a sense of duplication or 
imitation, but does provide an example of the necessary 
ingredients for a successful policy of repression.  Those 
ingredients do not really exist in Egypt. Jordan is an 
example worth emulating, not only because of its relative 
success at assimilating the Islamists into the political 
system, but also because of the humanity that the government 
has demonstrated in its dealings with the opposition 
relative to Syria, Algeria and Egypt.  Algeria is not only 
an example of the failure of governmental policy in dealing 
with Islamists, but also demonstrates how important it is to 
have a successful policy.  Larger trends found by analyzing 
the three countries as a group show that the key to the 
success or failure of government policies towards Islamist 
political opposition in Arab countries is the loyalty of the 
military to the political leader.  Also, Islamists are 
largely driven by poor economic conditions but that factor 
can be overcome by political liberalization. 
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The brutal repression and eradication of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood by Hafiz al-Asad is not likely to be 
duplicated by Egypt for a couple of reasons.  First, Egypt 
is more closely tied to the West, which has a high regard to 
human rights and would react very negatively to such acts of 
brutality.  Secondly, there is a much larger segment of 
rural Islamists in Egypt than there was in Syria, making the 
process of annihilation through concentrated use of force 
much more difficult. 
After Israel, Egypt is the largest recipient of aid 
from the United States in the Middle East.  The U.S. would 
have a very strong negative reaction if Egypt resorted to 
the kind of brutality that occurred in Syria in the early 
1980s.  Political censure, cuts in aid, and economic 
measures such as a trade embargo are all probable measures 
that the West would take against Egypt in such a case. 
Egypt is already in economic turmoil and could not afford to 
become the pariah of the international community. 
The repression that Syrian troops inflicted upon the 
Islamists was possible, in large part, because Syrian 
Islamism was an urban based movement.  The concentration of 
Islamists in the Syrian cities made it easy for the military 
to move in and kill them.  In Egypt, however, there is a 
large segment of the Islamist movement in rural Upper Egypt 
that would make similar repression nearly impossible.  It 
would be much harder to find the Islamists and practically 
impossible to concentrate military force against them as was 
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done in Aleppo and Hama.  The military would find itself 
fighting against guerrillas in southern Egypt, getting 
caught in a battle of attrition. 
What the Syrian model demonstrates very well is the 
ingredients necessary for a government to implement a policy 
of overwhelming repression and be successful.  The 
leadership must be authoritarian and must enjoy the total 
loyalty of the military.  The opposition must be accessible, 
identifiable, and concentrated in order for the military to 
be able to inflict massive casualties.  Finally, the 
leadership must have the will to take such bloody measures. 
The Jordanian model of co-optation is also 
enlightening.  It demonstrates that the Islamists can be 
assimilated into the political process and that 
democratization can be successful in Arab states, even 
though it may be a slow process. The Jordanian Islamists 
have shown that they are willing to assume a moderate tack 
as long as they are given the opportunity to voice their 
opposition.  Also, they have proven that they are willing to 
abide by the popular vote, even when it means they do not 
get their way.  King Hussein has demonstrated that Islamists 
can be assimilated into the political system and that their 
opposition can be regulated to political debate.  He has 
also shown that it is possible to retain power while giving 
the opposition a chance to actually manage parts of the 
government.  The ideology of the Muslim Brethren in Jordan 
is very similar to that of the Egyptian Brotherhood: 
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peaceful change through the political process.  Therefore, 
the Jordanian model is very pertinent to the Egyptian case 
and can provide many valuable lessons for assimilating 
Egyptian Islamists into their political system. 
If Syria and Jordan are examples of successful 
governmental policies in dealing with Islamist opposition, 
then Algeria represents the other end of the continuum.  It 
also illustrates what may happen if the Egyptian policy 
fails.  The Algerian case confirms that Islamists are 
willing to abide by the democratic process to implement 
their policies.  It also confirms that the Islamists have 
alot to learn about administration before they can transform 
rhetoric into real change. 
The possibility of Egypt ending up in a similar 
situation as Algeria is very real.  The passions that have 
erupted to push Algeria into civil war surely lurk just 
beneath the surface of Egyptian society and the government's 
present policy may be the spark that sets off the explosion. 
Looking at all three cases as a group, a couple of 
patterns become apparent that indicate possible paradigms 
for the region.  First of all, the outcome of the policies 
in each case is largely dependent on the military.  The 
successful repression in Syria was due to the loyalty of the 
army troops while killing fellow Syrians.  The successful 
co-optation of Islamists in Jordan was possible because the 
army is fiercely loyal to the king and is an intimidating 
factor to any. Islamists that may consider violence.  Also, 
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their loyalty allowed King Hussein to implement his 
preferential policies towards the Islamists without fear of 
violent reprisals from other groups.  On the other hand, the 
Algerian army's unwillingness to allow the Islamists to take 
office was a big step towards civil war.  In places where 
the democratic process is not a fact of life, military power 
is a deciding factor in the success and failure of 
governmental policy. 
This lesson is particularly applicable to Egypt which 
is also run by a military regime.  As soon as Mubarak loses 
the confidence of the military, he will cease to be 
president.  A situation in which this may occur is if he 
becomes overwhelmingly unpopular due to policies of 
repression towards moderate Islamists in the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Mubarak's unpopularity may reach a point that 
the military loses faith in his ability to lead the country 
and another military officer waiting in the wings will 
replace him. 
The second pattern evident in the three countries is 
the economic factor in Islamic discontent.  Syrian Muslim 
Brethren were businessmen who were adversely affected by 
Asad's economic policies, the majority of FIS members in 
Algeria are unemployed youth, and Egypt's Islamic extremists 
are from the lower class and have few prospects of breaking 
out of their caste.  Jordan also has economic problems, but 
the fact that Islamists are willing to work within the 
political system and not resort to violence despite those 
ill 
problems is very encouraging and is another lesson that 
Egypt needs to recognize. 
In order for Egypt to control the Islamist movement, it 
must channel them into non-violent opposition through 
political liberalization.  The Muslim Brotherhood must be 
allowed to have its own political party and provide 
candidates for elections.  The poor economic conditions in 
Egypt cannot be solved quickly and the situation is only 
exacerbated by denying the Islamists a voice in government. 
The cases in Jordan and Algeria demonstrate that Islamists 
are capable of working within a democratic system if given 
the chance.  Although Egypt has chosen a policy of 
repression there is no chance of duplicating the success of 
the policy in Syria and a very real chance of ending up with 
a situation similar to Algeria's.  Therefore, the only 
solution is opening the political system up to include 
Islamist opposition, as in Jordan, and thereby co-opting 
them by giving them a stake in the government. 
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